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I.  Introduction 
A.  The Argument 
1.  The Question 
Can fear constitute injury-in-fact for Article III standing?  Setting out 
the first unified treatment of the doctrine of fear-based standing, this Note 
argues that it can.  This Note defines, identifies, and expounds the doctrine 
of fear-based standing, an Article III standing doctrine.  Courts apply it 
often, but selectively and with limited consistency.  Fear-based standing is a 
doctrine that permits fear of future or present harm to constitute injury-in-
fact. This Note identifies the doctrine through courts’ use of it and 
emphasizes how fear-based standing is developing. The doctrine is 
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changing.  Some courts are poised to expand it radically, others to eliminate 
it.  This Note argues for a robust doctrine of fear-based standing and 
proposes an analytical framework for courts to adopt when confronted with 
alleged fear-based grounds for standing. 
2.  What is Fear-Based Standing? 
Fear-based standing is the doctrine that allows fear of harm to lead to 
cognizable injury-in-fact for Article III1 standing.  It is an exception carved 
out of—or another way of fulfilling—the requirement that cognizable 
injury-in-fact be actual or imminent as well as concrete and particularized.2  
The cognizability of fear as injury-in-fact is not a simple issue.  Since the 
early 1970s, courts have developed a complex jurisprudence of fear-based 
standing that reaches areas of the law as diverse as environmental 
litigation,3 electoral law,4 and national security law.5  The doctrine, 
developed in three distinct lines of cases, encompasses three ways of 
cognizing fear as injury-in-fact:  (1) as chilling effect injury; (2) as fear of 
the enforcement of a statute or regulation before it is enforced; and (3) as 
fear of anticipated, future harm. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 2. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T]he plaintiff 
must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 3. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 
149, 150 (4th Cir. 2000) (challenging Gaston Copper’s discharge of pollutants into a river); 
cf. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(considering fear-based standing in a case that deals with an issue characterized as being of 
great importance).  According to the Central Delta Water Agency court, the case "requires us 
to address the circumstances under which a party that fears that it will be significantly 
injured by another’s actions may bring a lawsuit to prevent the possible future injury.  The 
dispute involves one [of] the most contentious issues in the western United States:  the 
management of water resources."  Cent. Delta Water Agency, 306 F.3d at 943 (emphasis 
added). 
 4. See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 
2000) (considering a challenge to provisions of Vermont’s campaign finance system); N.H. 
Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1996) (considering 
a challenge to aspects of New Hampshire’s campaign finance system regulations).   
 5. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(challenging statutory provisions providing for surveillance of "non-United States persons 
outside the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence"), reh’g en banc 
denied, __ F.3d __, No. 09-4112-cv, 2011 WL 4381737 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2011). 
1448 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445 (2011) 
3.  Why Fear-Based Standing? 
Fear-based standing is an issue of critical importance—both because 
of the substantive claims of the litigation in which it is invoked and because 
of the increasingly unsettled character of the doctrine.  For example, in 
recent years, in suits challenging government action, particularly certain 
responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and government 
national security programs, the doctrine of fear-based standing—or, more 
precisely, its limits—has been one of the government’s primary defenses.6  
Recently, the doctrine has become essential to fear of identity theft 
litigation.7  More broadly, however, the doctrine potentially may be 
implicated whenever plaintiffs challenge as yet unrealized future harm. 
Not only is fear-based standing an issue of critical importance, but this 
is a critical moment in its development.  Since 2000 and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services (TOC), Inc.,8 courts have expressed a willingness to grant standing 
to fear-based claims.9  They have hinted at expanding the cognizability of 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (challenging "the President’s authority to designate terrorist organizations when 
there is an extraordinary threat to national security"); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 651 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (Batchelder, J.) (noting that the NSA appealed from summary judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs by "arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing"); Amnesty Int’l USA v. 
McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The Government contends as a 
threshold matter that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the [FISA Amendments Act of 
2008]."), rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), 
reh’g en banc denied, __ F.3d __, No. 09-4112-cv, 2011 WL 4381737 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 
2011). 
 7. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(reversing dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing because both "generalized anxiety 
and stress" and "increased . . . risk of future harm" as a result of data theft constituted 
sufficient injury); McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944(VLB), 
2009 WL 2843269, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) (recognizing fear of identity theft as 
sufficient for standing (citing Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 
2006))); cf. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding 
increased risk of harm from data theft sufficient for standing). 
 8. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
184 (2000) (discussing reasonable fear as a basis for standing).   
 9. See, e.g., Me. People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 285 (1st Cir. 
2006) (finding injury-in-fact sufficient for standing in "increased risk" which "rendered 
reasonable the actions of the plaintiffs’ members in abstaining from their desired enjoyment 
of the Penobscot"); Denny, 443 F.3d at 264 ("An injury-in-fact may simply be the fear or 
anxiety of future harm."); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950 
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding injury-in-fact on the basis of "a credible threat of harm" to 
environmental interests); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 
F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding injury-in-fact sufficient for standing in a plaintiff’s 
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alleged fear-based injuries.10  Yet, this evolution in the doctrine has taken 
place largely without Supreme Court guidance:  Laidlaw is the only case in 
which the Supreme Court has dealt with fear-based standing directly since 
the 1980s.11  But the Court’s treatment of the issue is unclear and cast in 
ambiguous language.12 
Moreover, in the courts of appeals, no clear approach has emerged.  
Before 2010, courts recognized that it was at least theoretically possible for 
fear to constitute injury-in-fact in some circumstances.  Some courts have 
even liberalized the doctrine and expanded the cognizability of fear, 
although they limited these changes to particular factual circumstances.13  
Some judges too, although not writing for majorities, have urged the 
expansion of the doctrine to the point that political fear would be 
independently cognizable as injury.14  And one court has found fear to be 
independently cognizable as injury-in-fact.15 
                                                                                                                 
member’s "reasonable fear and concern about the effects of Gaston Copper’s discharge, 
supported by objective evidence," fear and concern which "directly affect his recreational 
and economic interests"). 
 10. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184 (rejecting an argument made by the dissent that 
Lyons should be invoked to reject the plaintiffs’ asserted injuries for standing (citing City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983))). 
 11. See Bradford Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den:  Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute’s Misuse of Lyons’s "Realistic Threat" of Harm Standing Test, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
837, 845–72 (2010) [hereinafter Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den] (surveying Lyons’s 
progeny in the Supreme Court and in the courts of appeals); Jeremy A.M. Evans, Note, 
Speech, Spouses, and Standing:  Is there Standing to Sue when Sanctions Threatened against 
One’s Spouse Chill Protected Expression?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 147, 153–55 (2003) (surveying 
the Supreme Court’s chilling effect jurisprudence and listing the most recent such Supreme 
Court decision as Meese in 1987). 
 12. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184–85 (discussing the sufficiency of reasonable fear for 
the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III). 
 13. Cf. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003) (understanding Gaston 
Copper to allow for increased cognizability of probabilistic, risk-related harm and extending 
this understanding from an environmental context to a food safety one). 
 14. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 699 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that reasonable fear can be sufficient or even "well beyond what is 
needed" for standing). 
 15. See Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) ("An injury-
in-fact may simply be the fear or anxiety of future harm.").  Even since 2010, the Second 
Circuit has followed a more permissive approach to fear-based standing.  See Amnesty Int’l 
USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) ("Because standing may be based on a 
reasonable fear of future injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury, and the plaintiffs have 
established that they have a reasonable fear of injury and have incurred costs to avoid it, we 
agree that they have standing.").  Dissenting opinions from the recent denial of a rehearing 
en banc, however, show that the judges of the Second Circuit are sharply divided about the 
result in Clapper.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, __ F.3d __, No. 09-4112-cv, 
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Since 2007, the Sixth Circuit, perhaps the court of appeals with the 
most extensive fear-based standing jurisprudence, has been expounding, 
case-by-case, a doctrine of fear-based standing.16  Yet, in 2010, the Sixth 
Circuit, in White v. United States,17 implied the elimination of the doctrine 
and the denial of standing to any fear-based claim not independently 
cognizable as another type of injury-in-fact.18 
This Note is the first assessment of White in legal scholarship.  It 
argues against White and advocates a pre-White approach.  It urges its 
proposed framework as an alternative to White, as a distillation and 
refinement of the doctrine as it existed in 2009.  The Note does what 
commentators and courts have not done—set out the doctrine of fear 
comprehensively, as a unified doctrine that has three distinct strains. 
Commentators—both academics and practitioners—have overlooked 
the doctrine of fear-based standing, considered comprehensively.  
Academic discussion focuses instead on specific aspects of the doctrine in 
particular areas of the law, most frequently environmental litigation, 
national security, and surveillance law.19  Courts have approached fear-
                                                                                                                 
2011 WL 4381737, at *8 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2011) (Raggi, J., dissenting) ("The panel’s 
reduced standing standard is so at odds with [Supreme Court] precedent as to compel 
rejection en banc.  Because this court, by an equally divided vote, declines to convene for 
that purpose, I respectfully dissent."). 
 16. See White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2010) (considering fear 
of false prosecution as alleged injury-in-fact); Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 
962 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing the alleged chilling of speech because of a court’s "courtesy 
and civility rules and the threat of discipline for violating them" as an alleged injury-in-fact 
as well as the threat of future injury as alleged injury-in-fact); Morrison v. Bd. of Ed. of 
Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 610 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding an alleged chill of First Amendment 
rights to be subjective and therefore not cognizable as injury-in-fact); Hange v. City of 
Mansfield, 257 Fed. App’x. 887, 892 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that fear of being subject to 
future discipline by an employer without "a likelihood of future or continuing injury" is 
insufficient harm to constitute injury-in-fact); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 665 (6th Cir. 
2007) (Batchelder, J.) (discussing and rejecting certain chilling effects, inter alia, as bases 
for standing); Grendell v. Ohio Sup. Ct., 252 F.3d 828, 834–35 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the 
alleged chilling effect of attorney sanctions as injury-in-fact). 
 17. See White, 601 F.3d at 548 (affirming dismissal of a challenge to the Animal 
Welfare Act for lack of standing). 
 18. Id. at 554 (requiring, effectively, the showing of an independently cognizable 
injury as confirmatory of a subjective fear in order for the fear to be cognizable as injury-in-
fact). 
 19. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Removing "The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry":  
Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 169–221 (2007) (considering increased risk as a potential injury for 
the purposes of standing in suits related to the environment and public health); Steven G. 
Davison, Standing to Sue in Citizen Suits Against Air and Water Polluters Under Friends of 
the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 86–
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based standing more completely, but even the most comprehensive opinions 
do not address all three of the doctrine’s strains substantially.20 
This Note identifies and articulates the doctrine fully.  It identifies its 
various strains, their points of overlap, and the difficulties that spring from 
them.  It proposes an analytical framework that both clarifies and unifies 
the doctrine and its various strains to preserve the doctrine as it was in 2009 
against the countervailing trend of White. 
B.  The Structure of the Note 
This Note has two purposes.  First, to expound the doctrine of fear-
based standing as it currently exists.  Second, to propose and advocate an 
                                                                                                                 
87 (2003) (suggesting that Laidlaw imposes a "‘reasonable concern’ test" for standing in 
similar environmental cases); Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental 
Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897, 945–54 (2006) (discussing fear as injury in the specific context 
of environmental law); Bradford Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons:  A Risk-Based 
Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 737 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and 
Statistical Persons] (discussing probabilistic risk as a potential injury for standing and 
arguing that "[a] one in one million risk of death  or serious injury is the most plausible 
quantitative threshold for standing"); Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute 
Rejects Probabilistic Standing, but a "Realistic Threat" of Harm is a Better Standing Test, 
40 ENV. L. 89, 100–12 (2010) [hereinafter Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects 
Probabilistic Standing] (discussing risk of harm as a basis for standing in Laidlaw and 
Summers and focusing on the concept of probabilistic harm); Scott Michelman, Who Can 
Sue Over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 71, 105–06 (2009) (arguing for "the 
viability of chilling-effect claims as a basis for standing to challenge government 
surveillance"); Michael N. Dolich, Note, Alleging a First Amendment Chilling Effect to 
Create a Plaintiff’s Standing:  A Practical Approach, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 189 (1994) 
(listing factors that a plaintiff’s attorney should consider when making a claim based on an 
alleged First Amendment chilling effect injury); Evans, supra note 11, at 167 (arguing that 
courts should adopt a "choice test" when determining whether an alleged chill of First 
Amendment rights based on fear of harm to one’s spouse is asserted as injury-in-fact for 
standing); Mary D. Fan, Case Comment, Risk Magnified:  Standing Under the Statist Lens, 
112 YALE L.J. 1633, 1634 (2003) (discussing probabilistic future injuries with respect to 
Lyons, Laidlaw, and Central Delta Water Agency); Michael C. Miller, Note, Standing in the 
Wake of the Terrorist Surveillance Program:  A Modified Standard for Challenges to Secret 
Government Surveillance, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 1039, 1069–70 (2008) (advocating 
application of a "reasonable fear of harm from undisputed conduct" test be allied to 
"challenges to the [Terrorist Surveillance Program]"). 
 20. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 661–62, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2007) (Batchelder, J.) 
(discussing chilling effect and anticipatory harm); N.H. Right to Life Political Action 
Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 14 (1996) (discussing pre-enforcement fear and chilling 
effect); Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 644–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(discussing chilling effect and pre-enforcement fear), rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. 
Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, __ F.3d __, No. 09-4112-
cv, 2011 WL 4381737 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2011). 
1452 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445 (2011) 
analytical framework for courts to adopt when deciding fear-based 
standing arguments. 
This Note achieves these purposes in five Parts.  Part I is this 
introduction.  Part II sets out the doctrine of fear-based standing and its 
three distinct but often interrelated strains as they have developed from 
Supreme Court decisions in the early 1970s21 up to, but not including, 
the Sixth Circuit’s 2007 decision in ACLU v. NSA.22  Part II contains 
three substantive subparts, each of which addresses a different strain of 
fear-based standing:  alleged chilling effect injury, pre-enforcement fear, 
and anticipatory harm injury.   
Part III considers in detail the most significant recent appellate 
decisions on fear-based standing, the Sixth Circuit’s 2007 decision in 
ACLU and its 2010 decision in White.  These two cases, unlike other 
recent appellate cases that discuss fear-based standing and primarily 
apply existing doctrine, not only show, but also shape and advance the 
development of fear-based standing doctrine.   
Part IV proposes and advocates the adoption of a framework for 
analysis of fear-based standing arguments.  It details problems inherent 
in courts’ current approaches, outlines and explicates the proposed 
framework, and argues that it resolves the problems inherent in current 
approaches.  Part IV contains three substantive subparts.  The first 
considers the current doctrine of fear-based standing.  The second 
proposes the framework.  The third argues for the framework. 
C.  The Doctrine of Constitutional Standing 
As noted, the doctrine of constitutional standing has its foundation 
in Article III’s grant of jurisdiction to the federal judiciary to hear and 
decide "Cases"23 and "Controversies."24  Although the doctrine 
developed irregularly25 and is the subject of considerable 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (rejecting an argument for standing 
based on an alleged chill of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights); Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (rejecting an argument for standing based on plaintiffs’ alleged feeling of 
inhibition). 
 22. See ACLU, 493 F.3d at 687 (Batchelder, J.) (dismissing a challenge to the NSA’s 
wiretapping program for lack of standing). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion?  The Dangers of Imposing a 
Standing Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391, 394–400 (2009) (surveying the history of the 
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debate,26 particularly as to its theoretical justifications,27 it may be stated 
succinctly.  As the Supreme Court noted in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:28  
"[O]ur cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum 
of standing contains three elements.  First, the plaintiff must have suffered 
an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical."29  The Court went on to describe the other two 
requirements of constitutional standing.  The second:  "Second, there must 
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—
the injury has to be fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third 
party not before the court."30  And the third:  "Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as 
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a 
favorable decision.’"31 
That said, fear-based standing doctrine, while governed by these rules 
and derived from them, as will be seen, operates on its own terms in ways 
considered consistent with these broader, general provisions of 
constitutional standing.32 
D.  Definitions of Frequently Used Terms 
This subpart outlines how this Note uses terms that refer to frequently 
discussed concepts.  The words "fear," "harm," "injury," and "threat"  
appear throughout this Note.  This Note uses the example of a shark attack 
to explain further the precise meanings of the terms at issue.  Except when 
                                                                                                                 
development of Article III standing). 
 26. See Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 466–67 
(2008) (surveying the controversies that relate to standing doctrines). 
 27. See id. at 461 (arguing that standing is traditionally justified on separation of 
powers grounds, but that, in this context, separation of powers has multiple meanings or 
understandings, which are in effect distinct rationales for standing doctrine). 
 28. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding that 
Defenders of Wildlife lacked standing to challenge environmental regulations). 
 29. Id. at 560 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30. Id. (citations omitted). 
 31. Id. at 561 (citations omitted). 
 32. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(setting out a three-part test for alleged chilling effect injuries such that "plaintiffs in a suit 
for prospective relief based on a ‘chilling effect’ on speech can satisfy the requirement that 
their claim of injury be ‘concrete and particularized’"). 
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referring to and describing courts’ uses of these terms, this Note employs 
them consistently with the following meanings: 
Fear—an emotional or psychological effect of the expectation of 
experiencing or suffering something undesirable or detrimental.  Fear has a 
subject—the person who experiences it.  It has an object—that which is 
undesirable or detrimental.  It relates to future time, whether the immediate 
or distant future.  It may be rational or irrational—justified by valid reasons 
(for example, evidence of the likelihood of the realization of the undesired 
event) or not.  For example, when a swimmer is afraid of a shark attack, the 
swimmer is the subject of the fear.  The shark attack is the object.  The fear 
may exist whether the swimmer is currently swimming or plans to go 
swimming in the distant future.  It may exist whether the swimmer is 
swimming in a part of the ocean where there have been frequent shark 
attacks or the swimmer is swimming in a shark-free indoor swimming pool.  
While fear may be felt or experienced individually or collectively,33 this 
Note emphasizes its individual aspects.   
Harm—something undesirable, such as pain, suffering, damage, loss, 
or deprivation of a right.  In most cases, a harm is the object of fear.  For 
the purposes of this Note, it is a broader term than "injury":  All injury may 
be harm, but not all harm is injury.  In the shark attack example, the shark 
attack is the harm. 
Injury—a technical term that indicates the first prong of an Article III 
standing analysis.  It does not appear in a more colloquial sense as 
particularized suffering.  As indicated above, this Note refers to such 
suffering as harm. 
Threat—a future, as yet unrealized, harm also referred to as a 
threatened harm.  That is, a threat is a particular type of harm and, like harm 
more generally, is often an object of fear.  A threat can also be a present 
statement of a future harm.  Because it is not yet realized, whether it is in 
fact real may be open to speculation.  It is therefore often described as 
alternatively, for example, credible or real.  Yet, even the existence of a real 
threat does not necessarily imply the realization of the threatened harm, but 
the existence of the conditions under which the threatened harm may occur.  
Consider the shark attack example.  For the swimmer swimming as yet 
unassaulted by a shark, the attack is a threat.  If a shark approaches and 
begins to follow the swimmer, there may be a real threat of a shark attack.  
                                                                                                                 
 33. See COREY ROBIN, FEAR:  THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA 18 (2004) (discussing 
two "mode[s]" of political fear, the first of which "involves a collective’s fear of far away 
dangers or of objects, like a foreign enemy, separate from the collective"). 
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If the swimmer sets out swimming after having been told that there have 
been sightings of a shark in the area and that the previous day it had 
attacked a surfer, there may be a credible threat of a shark attack.  The 
conditions are conducive to a shark attack. 
II.  The Development of the Doctrine of Fear-Based Standing 
A.  Introduction 
This Part of the Note sets out the state of the law of fear-based 
standing prior to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in ACLU.  It discusses the 
leading cases on the issue, their holdings, and the scope and applicability of 
these holdings.  Seven cases form the foundation of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence of fear-based standing—Laird v. Tatum34 and Meese v. 
Keene;35 Younger v. Harris,36 Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National 
Union,37 and Virginia v. American Booksellers Association;38 and City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons39 and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.—and these cases deal with three 
distinct aspects of fear-based standing—chilling effect injury, pre-
enforcement fear of the enforcement of a statute, and anticipated, but 
unrealized, anticipatory or proleptic harm.  This Part groups these cases by 
the aspect of fear-based standing that each considers.  In addition, various 
circuit court decisions further explicate rules that the Court established.  
This Part addresses these cases after the relevant Supreme Court decisions 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) ("[O]n this record the respondents have 
not presented a case for resolution by the courts.").   
 35. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473 (1987) ("We find, however, that appellee 
has alleged more than a ‘subjective chill’; he establishes that the term ‘political propaganda’ 
threatens to cause him cognizable injury."). 
 36. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) ("A federal lawsuit to stop a state 
prosecution is a serious matter.  And persons having no fears of state prosecution except 
those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs in 
such cases."). 
 37. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302 (1979) 
(finding that plaintiffs had alleged cognizable injury to establish standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a section of an Arizona farm labor statute).   
 38. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (finding 
cognizable injury because the "plaintiffs have alleged an actual and well-founded fear that 
the law will be enforced against them"). 
 39. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983) (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief because of lack of standing).   
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that they interpret.  Of particular note are United Presbyterian Church v. 
Reagan40 and Ozonoff v. Berzak,41 which discuss chilling effects; New 
Hampshire Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Gardner,42 which 
considers pre-enforcement fear; and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston 
Copper Recycling Corp.43 and Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG,44 which discuss 
anticipatory harm. 
B.  Chilling Effect 
Laird is the lead case on chilling effect45 as cognizable injury-in-fact.46  
In it, the plaintiffs, "seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,"47 challenged 
intelligence or data gathering activity conducted and intended to be used by 
the United States Army in the event that local law enforcement 
organizations sought its assistance in responding to civil unrest.48  They 
asserted that the Army’s action violated their rights49 and, specifically, that 
they suffered a chilling effect on their First Amendment rights.50  On 
review, the Court considered the question of whether Article III standing 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(finding that the plaintiffs’ alleged chilling effect injury was "nothing more than a 
‘generalized grievance’" and therefore not cognizable). 
 41. See Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 230 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that Ozonoff’s 
alleged injury satisfied the requirements for standing).   
 42. See N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 
1996) (determining that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge provisions of New 
Hampshire election law).   
 43. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 
161 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that the plaintiffs asserted cognizable injury-in-fact for Article 
III standing). 
 44. See Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding 
that a class of plaintiffs fulfilled the requirements for Article III standing).   
 45. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:  Unraveling the 
Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689–90 (1978) (defining what a chilling effect is, 
particularly in a First Amendment context).   
 46. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 19, at 82 (discussing the influence of Laird on 
subsequent jurisprudence). 
 47. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 2 (1972). 
 48. See id. at 4–6 (describing the Army’s surveillance operations).   
 49. See id. at 2 ("Respondents brought this class action in the District Court seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief on their claim that their rights were being invaded by the 
Department of the Army’s alleged ‘surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political 
activity.’"). 
 50. Id. at 10. 
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exists for "a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First 
Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of 
a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to 
be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of 
a valid governmental purpose."51 
According to the Court, "[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not" 
sufficient to constitute injury-in-fact for Article III standing.52  Fear of 
government action—on the basis of such surveillance or intelligence 
gathering—does not, by itself, constitute injury.53  Yet, it may if "the 
challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or 
compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or 
prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that 
he was challenging."54  The Court did not preclude fear from leading to 
sufficient injury for standing.55  But fear cannot do this if it exists solely in 
the mind of the plaintiff.56 
In Meese, the Court offered an example of circumstances in which a 
chilling effect constituted sufficient injury for Article III standing.57  Meese 
involved a plaintiff who, while a state senator, wanted to show three films 
that had been classified as political propaganda by the Department of 
Justice.58  Doing so, however, would have subjected him to registration and 
reporting requirements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 13–14.   
 53. See id. at 10 (setting out the question considered by the Court and noting that the 
court of appeals, which had previously found cognizable injury, was incorrect). 
 54. See id. at 11 (distinguishing cases in which a chilling effect was found to be a 
violation of First Amendment rights). 
 55. See id. at 15 ("[O]ur conclusion is a narrow one, namely, that on this record the 
respondents have not presented a case for resolution by the courts.").  This statement by the 
Court has produced some question about the broader applicability of the Court’s ruling in 
Laird.  See Michelman, supra note 19, at 86 (listing questions that remained after Laird 
about the sufficiency of alleged surveillance-based chilling effect injury as a basis for 
standing).   
 56.  See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 2 (1972) ("Allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are 
not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of 
specific future harm . . . .").   
 57.  See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987) (concluding that the harms that the 
plaintiff suffered constituted "cognizable injury").   
 58. Id. at 467–68.  The films were Canadian and "deal[t] with the subjects of nuclear 
war and acid rain."  Id. at 468.  Further, "one of them won an ‘Oscar’ award from the 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences as the best foreign documentary in 1983."  Id. 
at 475. 
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1938.59  Because of the potential damage to his reputation due to the 
requirements of the Act, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the 
application of the Act to the showing of these three films.60  On review, the 
Court considered what would constitute sufficient injury for standing.  The 
Court addressed Laird,61 but found that the plaintiff "demonstrated more 
than a ‘subjective chill.’"62  The future classification by the Justice 
Department of his showing the films as political propaganda constituted 
sufficient injury.63  Even so, Meese did not set out a broad rule about what 
constitutes injury for standing, but offered a data-point that helps mark the 
parameters of Laird’s rule.   
Circuit court decisions offer additional data-points that further indicate 
the contours of the Laird rule.  United Presbyterian Church involved a 
challenge to Executive Order 12333, which dealt with "the organization, 
procedures and limitations to the foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities of the Executive Branch."64  In addition to 
other alleged injuries, the D.C. Circuit considered in particular as an alleged 
injury the chilling of First Amendment speech and assembly rights.65  It 
analyzed this issue under Laird’s rule rejecting subjective chill as 
cognizable injury.66  But, in doing so, the court cast doubt on the 
sufficiency of a chilling effect as injury:  "‘Chilling effect’ is cited as the 
reason why the governmental imposition is invalid rather than as the harm 
which entitles the plaintiff to challenge it."67  To paraphrase, a chilling 
effect may not be a harm, but the reason why another harm, which is 
cognizable as injury, is harmful.68  Regardless, the court found that the 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 467 (citing the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 631–33 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–21 (1966))). 
 60. Id. at 468. 
 61. See id. at 472 ("In determining whether a litigant has standing to challenge 
governmental action as a violation of the First Amendment, we have required that the 
litigant demonstrate ‘a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future 
harm.’" (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 401 U.S. 1, 14 (1972))). 
 62. Id. at 473.  Although the Meese Court does not emphasize this, recent alleged 
chilling effect case law tends to emphasize the showing of something "more than a 
‘subjective chill.’"  Id. 
 63. See id. (noting that the classification of films as "political propaganda" "threatens 
to cause [the plaintiff] cognizable injury").   
 64. United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 65. Id. at 1377–78. 
 66. Id. at 1378. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 1378–79 ("In fact, some who have successfully challenged governmental 
action on ‘chilling effect’ grounds have themselves demonstratively not suffered the harm of 
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plaintiffs’ alleged chill was not an effect of "direct government constraint"69 
such as would meet Laird’s requirement for sufficiency for injury.70   
In contrast, in Ozonoff, the First Circuit found circumstances under 
which an alleged chilling effect constituted injury-in-fact.  As part of an 
application for short-term employment with the World Health Organization 
(WHO), Ozonoff, an international health expert, underwent a full FBI 
background check,71 which did not produce "reasonable doubts concerning 
his loyalty."72  After receiving the position and completing the tasks 
required, the WHO invited him to apply for a subsequent, possibly 
permanent, position.73  The application process for this new position would 
have entailed another loyalty investigation.74  Asserting, among other 
harms,75 that the loyalty investigation "inhibit[ed] him from joining the 
organizations that he wish[ed] to join and from expressing opinions that he 
[might] hold," Ozonoff sued for declaratory relief against the government 
action.76 
On appeal, the court considered the sufficiency of the alleged injury—
a chilling effect on First Amendment rights—for standing.  When 
considering the issue with respect to Laird, the court emphasized Laird’s 
indication that a chill when combined with something "more" would 
constitute sufficient injury for standing.77  Because of the role of 
governmental action, the Ozonoff court found that the requirements of the 
"more" test had been met and that the chilling effect was cognizable injury 
for standing.78 
                                                                                                                 
any chill, since they went ahead and violated the governmental proscription anyway.").   
 69. Id. at 1380. 
 70. See id. ("[H]ere, as in Tatum, no part of the challenged scheme imposes or even 
relates to any direct governmental constraint upon the plaintiffs, and there is no reason why 
they would be unable to challenge any illegal surveillance of them when (and if) it occurs.").   
 71. Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 226 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 227. 
 75. See id.  ("Ozonoff says that the previous investigation took time, intruded upon his 
privacy, and injured his reputation."). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 229 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972)). 
 78. See id. ("Our case thus resembles, not Laird, in which the Court found no 
standing, but, rather, the cases that Laird distinguished, where standing was found.").  More 
specifically:  "The problem for the government with Laird, however, lies in the key words 
‘without more.’  The plaintiffs in Laird did not claim that the information gathering 
activities were directed against them specifically or that the gathered data could be directly 
used against them in any foreseeable way."  Id. 
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More generally, review of chilling effect cases that consider injury-in-
fact for Article III standing shows that Laird retains its force.  The primary 
issue for courts in such circumstances is determining what governmental 
action fulfills Laird’s something more test.79 
C.  Pre-Enforcement Fear 
Fear also has a role in an injury-in-fact analysis for standing in pre-
enforcement challenges to the constitutionality of statutes.  In First 
Amendment claims—but only in First Amendment claims—a plaintiff need 
only show a well-founded or reasonable fear of prosecution under the 
statute to meet the injury prong of a standing analysis.80  In cases that 
address this way of showing injury for standing, there has been some 
confusion with the analysis in chilling effect cases.81  Yet pre-enforcement 
fear remains a distinct way of establishing injury on account of fear and is 
perhaps the most direct way in which fear leads to cognizable injury. 
American Booksellers is the lead Supreme Court decision on this 
issue.82  The case involved a facial challenge by individual booksellers and 
American Booksellers Association to a Virginia statute that proscribed the 
knowing display of pornographic material in such a manner that minors 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Fieger v. Mich. Sup. Ct., 553 F.3d 955, 965 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he purported 
‘chilling effect’ . . . is objectively unsubstantiated and, accordingly, fails to give rise to an 
injury-in-fact); Morrison v. Bd. of Ed. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 609 (6th Cir. 2008) 
("The question before us, then, is what ‘more’ might be required to substantiate an 
otherwise-subjective allegation of chill, such that a litigant would demonstrate a proper 
injury-in-fact?"). 
 80. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988) ("[I]n the 
First Amendment context, [l]itigants . . . are permitted to challenge a statute not because 
their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or 
assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain 
from constitutionally protected expression." (quoting Sec’y of State of Md. v. J.H. Munson 
Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956–57 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 81. See id. at 393 (indicating that, when discussing pre-enforcement fear, "the alleged 
danger of this statute is, in large measure, one of self-censorship," that is, an inhibition from 
acting in a particular manner); N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 
F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying, explicitly, the same analytical framework to both pre-
enforcement fear and alleged chilling effect injury after recognizing that pre-enforcement 
fear and alleged chilling effect injury are separate bases for standing). 
 82. See David T. Hardy, Standing to Sue in the Absence of Prosecution:  Can a Case 
Be Too Controversial for Case or Controversy?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 53, 57) (2007) 
(listing American Booksellers along with Babbitt as foundational to this area of standing 
doctrine). 
FEAR-BASED STANDING:  COGNIZING AN INJURY-IN-FACT 1461 
would be able to view it.83  In considering injury for standing, the Court 
noted that the alleged injury must be "threatened or actual"84 and that the 
plaintiffs did not run afoul of this requirement because they had "alleged an 
actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against them."85  
The Court’s discussion of this way of establishing injury for standing is not 
detailed or extended, but rather limited to a recitation of this basis without 
citation of relevant authority—even though the Court had previously found 
injury on similar reasoning in Younger86 and Babbitt.87 
In this context, Babbitt is particularly significant because it supplies a 
rule of decision subsequently adopted by various circuit courts.88  The case 
involved pre-enforcement challenges to certain provisions of Arizona’s 
agricultural labor laws.89  Setting out the rule of decision, the Court noted: 
When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of 
conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed 
by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, 
he "should not be required to undergo criminal prosecution as the sole 
means of seeking relief."90 
Babbitt uses the presence of a credible threat of prosecution as part of its 
test for cognizable injury for standing.91  The Court tempered this rule by 
referring to fear:  "But ‘persons having no fears of state prosecution except 
those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as 
                                                                                                                 
 83. American Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 386. 
 84. Id. at 392 (quoting Wrath v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). 
 85. Id. at 393. 
 86. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) ("[P]ersons having no fears of state 
prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as 
appropriate plaintiffs in such cases.").  Younger shows well the similarity between alleged 
chilling effect injury and pre-enforcement fear.  Two of three plaintiffs challenging the 
constitutionality of a state syndicalism law—the plaintiffs who were not being prosecuted 
under it—alleged that they "fe[lt] inhibited in advocation of the program of their political 
party through peaceful, nonviolent means, because of the presence of the Act on the books."  
Id. at 41–42 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In this case, pre-enforcement fear is the fear 
that leads to the chilling effect. 
 87. See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing Babbitt’s treatment of 
this issue). 
 88. See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(following Babbitt’s rule). 
 89. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 292–93 (1979). 
 90. Id. at 298 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)) (citations omitted). 
 91. See id. (quoting Younger’s rule of decision regarding the sufficiency of fear to be 
cognizable injury).  That is, "imaginary and speculative fears" are not cognizable as injury.  
Id. 
1462 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445 (2011) 
appropriate plaintiffs.’"92  In its analysis, the Babbitt Court made reference 
to, if not relied on, fear:  A plaintiff may show cognizable injury "when fear 
of criminal prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional statute is not 
imaginary or wholly speculative."93  In this case, "[a]ppellees are not thus 
without some reason in fearing prosecution for violation of the ban on 
specified forms of consumer publicity.  In our view, the positions of the 
parties are sufficiently adverse . . . to present a case or controversy within 
the jurisdiction of the District Court."94 
Significantly, this requirement for pre-enforcement fear-based 
standing in these cases is less exacting than those for chilling effects and 
anticipatory harms.95  The threat or harm threatened need only be credible, 
not real, or, to rephrase, believable, not actual.  Likewise, the resultant fear 
need not be reasonable, without qualification, or confirmable with objective 
evidence,96 but "not wholly speculative."  Presumably, in this context, 
partially speculative fear is cognizable as injury.  One might argue that this 
test is a rewording of the "something more than subjective fear" test that has 
emerged out of Laird and its progeny97—a negatively phrased version 
instead of a positively phrased one.  Such a view is incorrect.  Subjective 
fear itself is not necessarily imaginary or speculative.  The terms used in 
Babbitt encompass more amorphous and less grounded emotional states.  
For example, in Laird, actual Army surveillance led to the subjective fear, 
which itself led to a non-cognizable subjective chill.98  There was some 
reason for this fear; it was not imaginary.  Yet, regardless, it was not 
cognizable.  Babbitt’s pre-enforcement fear test is more permissive than 
Laird’s chilling effect test. 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 42). 
 93. Id. at 302. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983) ("It is the reality of 
the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s 
subjective apprehensions.").   
 96. Cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 
161 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Shealy’s reasonable fear and concern about the effects of Gaston 
Copper’s discharge, supported by objective evidence, directly affects his recreational and 
economic interests." (emphasis added)).  The Babbitt Court notes that the plaintiff’s having 
"some reason" to be afraid fulfills the "not imaginary or wholly speculative" standard.  
Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302. 
 97. See supra Part II.B. (discussing subsequent Supreme Court and Circuit Court 
interpretation of Laird). 
 98. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (listing possible bases for the 
plaintiffs’ alleged chill and dismissing them as not leading to a chilling effect cognizable as 
injury).   
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Circuit court decisions further explicate the requirements for standing 
in constitutional challenges to statutes on the basis of pre-enforcement fear, 
but also show the difficulties and confusion that they can create.  For 
example, in New Hampshire Right to Life, the conflation of pre-
enforcement fear-based standing with chilling effect fear-based standing.  
Because both types of fear-based standing deal with First Amendment 
claims and involve similar factual situations, when plaintiffs assert both 
pre-enforcement fear and a chilling effect as cognizable injuries, some 
courts have shown a tendency to combine their analyses.  American 
Booksellers hinted at this at the end of its standing analysis:  "Further, the 
alleged danger of this statute is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a 
harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution."99  New 
Hampshire Right to Life, considering a challenge to certain sections of a 
campaign finance law,100 stated the tension between or relation of these two 
types of fear-based standing more directly:   
[T]hese two types of injury are interrelated.  Both hinge on the existence 
of a credible threat that the challenged law will be enforced.  If such a 
threat exists, then it poses a classic dilemma for an affected party:  either 
to engage in the expressive activity, thus courting prosecution, or to 
succumb to the threat, thus forgoing free expression.  Either injury is 
justiciable.101 
Despite recognizing the distinction between pre-enforcement fear as injury 
and chilling effect as injury, the court applied the same, single analytical 
approach to both:  "Because the threat of prosecution is a common 
denominator for both types of injury, their existence can be resolved with a 
single inquiry."102 
This is Babbitt’s credible threat analysis,103 and it controls both pre-
enforcement and chilling effect alleged injuries.  The court extended 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 389 (1988). 
 100. See N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 
1996) (outlining the statutory provisions that the plaintiffs challenged).  In the case, the New 
Hampshire Right to Life Political Action Committee challenged a "$1000 per election limit 
that New Hampshire place[d] on ‘independent expenditures’ in a political campaign."  Id. 
(citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:5, V; 664:3, I; 664:3, II (1995)).  "New Hampshire 
consider[ed] independent expenditures to include expenditures by a political committee for 
the purpose of ‘expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, 
or any authorized committee or agent of [any] candidate, and which are not made in concert 
with . . . any candidate . . . .’"  Id. at 10 n.1 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:2 (1995)). 
 101. Id. at 14. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. (noting that the credible threat standard "encapsulate[s]" Babbitt’s "not 
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Babbitt to apply to a situation that would otherwise be analyzed under Laird 
and its progeny.  In doing so, it applied a less onerous test—a one-pronged 
analysis, instead of a two-pronged analysis.104  Further, in applying this 
rule, the court adopted a somewhat less stringent understanding of it than 
seen either in Babbitt or in the court’s statement of the rule earlier in the 
opinion:  "[T]here is more than enough in the record to show that the threat 
of future prosecution is not wholly conjectural, but, rather, that it is 
sufficiently credible to confer standing . . . ."105 
This is not to suggest that such a conflation of pre-enforcement fear 
and chilling effect injuries has been widely adopted—it has not—but to 
suggest that there is a spectrum of existing approaches to the type of fear 
that may constitute or lead to cognizable injury-in-fact and that this 
spectrum is more liberal, or oriented toward cognizing fear as injury, in pre-
enforcement challenges to statutes’ constitutionality on First Amendment 
grounds than in challenges based on the alleged chilling of First 
Amendment rights. 
D.  Anticipatory Harm 
In addition to pre-enforcement fear and chilling effect injuries, fear has 
a significant role in the injury-in-fact analysis of standing in considerations 
of anticipated harms as injuries.  Because a potential plaintiff fears a future 
harm, can he or she assert that future harm as cognizable as injury-in-fact?  
The general rule suggests that only imminent threats of harm are 
cognizable.106  The injury is the harm threatened, but cognized in near 
                                                                                                                 
imaginary or wholly speculative" fear standard).  That is, it is possible to think of the 
credible threat standard as standing for the not imaginary or wholly speculative fear 
standard.  Further, as the court noted, Babbitt’s standard "is quite forgiving."  Id.  It 
represents a "low threshold" for establishing cognizable injury-in-fact.  Id. at 15. 
 104. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (setting out requirements for injury 
as a chill and something "more"); Morrison v. Bd. of Ed. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 609 
(6th Cir. 2008) ("The question before us, then, is what ‘more’ might be required to 
substantiate an otherwise subjective allegation of a chill, such that a litigant would 
demonstrate a proper injury in fact?" (citations omitted)).   
 105. N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.2d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 106. See Summers v. Earth  Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, __, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009) 
("To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering ‘injury 
in fact’ that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical . . . ."); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) (same); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992) (same); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) ("The plaintiff 
FEAR-BASED STANDING:  COGNIZING AN INJURY-IN-FACT 1465 
immediate anticipation of its realization, not only after its realization.107  
Fear-based anticipatory harm, however, expands the time prior to the 
realization of harm when the harm can be cognized as injury:  A harm can be 
cognizable when it begins to be feared, even if this occurs before it is 
imminent.  This strain of fear-based standing doctrine is an exception carved 
out of the general imminent threat rule.  Further, it is specific to fear:  Fear-
based anticipatory harm is different from risk or probabilistic harm, concepts 
with which it is frequently grouped in legal scholarship108 and court 
opinions.109  Fear is primarily subjective or has a substantial subjective 
component.  Risk and probabilistic harm are objective.  Two Supreme Court 
cases indicate the existence of and begin to set out the anticipatory harm 
strain of fear-based standing.  These are Lyons and Laidlaw. 
Lyons involved a complaint against the use by the police of a 
"chokehold"110 in the course of a traffic stop.  Lyons, allegedly injured by this 
chokehold, sought both damages for physical injury111 and injunctive 
relief.112  Lyons predicated his claim to this injunctive relief on his 
"justifiabl[e] fear that any contact he has with Los Angeles police officers 
may result in his being choked and strangled to death"113 and "threatened 
impairment of"114 First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
must show that he ‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct 
injury’ as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must 
be both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’" (citations omitted)). 
 107. See Fan, supra note 19, at 1634 ("The probability of a claimed future injury 
occurring ranges from nil to certainty.  The imminence standard shows that the Supreme 
Court calls for future injuries near certainty to find standing.").   
 108. See Craig, supra note 19, at 190 ("[F]ollowing the Laidlaw decision, several lower 
federal courts have explicitly and consciously transformed both the Laidlaw Court’s 
recognition of ‘reasonable fear’ and prior courts’ reliance on threatened injuries into an 
increased risk standing jurisprudence."); Lin, supra note 19, at 946–48 (viewing risk as 
objective and potentially causing or being the object of fear); Mank, Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic Standing, supra note 19, at 136–37 (suggesting that 
courts use the Summers dissent’s realistic threat test "to supplement or supplant the wobbly 
reasonable concerns test in Laidlaw"). 
 109. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 630 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the plaintiffs’ 
complaint as alleging injury due to "risk," "apprehension," and "concern"); Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160–61 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(describing "increased risk" as "sufficient to provide injury in fact" and the effect of 
"reasonable fear" as "constitut[ing] injury in fact").  
 110. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97. 
 111. Id. at 97–98.   
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 98 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. Id. 
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rights.115  On review, the Court considered and then denied the claim to 
injunctive relief because of lack of standing.116  To show cognizable injury, a 
plaintiff must, on the particular claim, "show that he ‘has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the 
challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be ‘real 
and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’"117  The Court found that 
the alleged injury was conjectural or speculative, and thus not cognizable.118 
In a footnote, the Court addressed Lyons’s argument about his fear.119  It 
noted that "[t]he reasonableness of Lyons’ fear is dependent upon the 
likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct.  It is the reality 
of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the 
plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions."120  The Court did not mention fear, even 
if reasonable, leading to cognizable injury.  Rather, fear is somewhat 
detached from a standing analysis.  To the extent that it is consistent with—or 
evidence of—a real threat it may be cognizable.  But even if it is reasonable, 
unless it is accompanied by a real threat, it is not cognizable:  "The emotional 
consequences of a prior act are simply not a sufficient basis for an injunction 
absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the defendant."121 
If there is uncertainty here, it is a result of there being two potential 
understandings of fear.  First, as injury on its own terms—an emotional harm 
related to prior physical harm.  The Court accepted this as a cause of action, 
but not relevant to Lyons’s claim to injunctive relief:  "[E]motional upset is a 
relevant consideration in a damages action."122  Second, as an extension of 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 101 ("We nevertheless hold . . . that the federal courts are without 
jurisdiction to entertain Lyons’ claim for injunctive relief."). 
 117. Id. at 101–02 (emphasis added). 
 118. See id. at 105 ("That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on 
October 6, 1976 . . . does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would be 
stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offence, by an officer or officers who would 
illegally choke him . . . ."). 
 119. Id. at 107 n.8. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.  Here, the Court distinguished between standing to sue for injunctive relief, 
which it considered here, and standing to sue for damages, which it did not.  See id. at 105 
("That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on October 6, 1976, while 
presumably affording Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual officers and 
perhaps against the city, does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat . . . ." 
(emphasis added)); see also Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den, supra note 11, at 849 
(discussing academic discussion and criticism of the Court’s requiring standing analyses for 
damages and injunctive relief). 
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the cognizability of anticipated harm as injury.  The Court rejected this.  
One cannot assert a fear of a distant, non-immediate harm or a threat, 
however likely or probable if not real and actual, and successfully achieve 
cognizable injury-in-fact.123 
However, the Lyons Court’s mention of the reasonableness of fear 
without much concerted explanation of the effect of this reasonableness 
might cause one to think that in some circumstances reasonableness of fear 
could have some effect or bearing on an injury-in-fact analysis.  It had such 
an effect in Laidlaw.  Laidlaw involved a suit against Laidlaw 
Environmental Services for violations of the Clean Water Act.124  To show 
injury for standing, members of Friends of the Earth claimed that various 
harms arose from Laidlaw’s discharge of mercury into a river from a 
wastewater treatment facility that it operated.125  These asserted harms 
included seeing the river apparently polluted,126 smelling such pollution,127 
and refraining from fishing in the river, as done previously, because of 
"concern[] that the water was polluted by Laidlaw’s discharges."128  The 
Court found that these harms were sufficient to establish injury-in-fact.129 
The Court considered Lyons in response to an argument offered by the 
dissent,130 namely, that the alleged harms that the plaintiffs asserted 
                                                                                                                 
 123. But cf. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1152–53 (2009) (suggesting 
that Lyons’s realistic fear test is less restrictive than the imminent harm standard for 
anticipatory harm, which standard is more broadly applicable, if not the current standard 
itself).  That is, in Summers, the Court criticized the Lyons test as being too permissive and, 
additionally, an inaccurate statement of the current standard.  Id. 
 124. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 173 
(2000). 
 125. See id. at 176 (noting that Laidlaw operated the facility pursuant to a permit that 
"placed limits on Laidlaw’s discharge of several pollutants into the river" and that 
"Laidlaw’s discharges exceeded the limits set by the permit").   
 126. Id. at 181. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 182. 
 129. See id. at 183 ("These sworn statements . . . adequately documented injury in fact.  
We have held that environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver 
that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational 
values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity." (quoting Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972))). 
 130. See id. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Ongoing ‘concerns’ about the environment 
are not enough, for ‘[i]t is the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the 
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions . . . .’" (quoting City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983))).  Justice Scalia continued:  "At the very 
least, in the present case, one would expect to see evidence supporting the affidavit’s bald 
assertions regarding decreasing recreational usage and declining home values, as well as 
evidence for the improbable proposition that Laidlaw’s violations . . . are somehow 
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constituted no more than subjective apprehension, which, according to 
Lyons, is not cognizable as injury-in-fact.131  Yet, the Court found that 
Lyons "does not weigh against standing in this case."132  In making this 
determination, the Court considered Lyons’s discussion of fear.  The Court 
understood Lyons to reject cognizing as injury subjective apprehension 
about the recurrence of unlawful conduct taking place:  "In the footnote 
from Lyons cited by the dissent, we noted that ‘[t]he reasonableness of 
Lyons’ fear is dependent upon the likelihood of a recurrence of the 
allegedly unlawful conduct,’ and that his ‘subjective apprehensions’ that 
such a recurrence would even take place were not enough to support 
standing."133  In Laidlaw, "unlawful conduct . . . was occurring."134  The 
Court’s analysis might have ended here.  It presented a rule of decision, 
applied that rule to the facts of Laidlaw, and found sufficient injury.   
But the Court did not stop here.  Instead, it stepped back and re-
characterized Lyons:  "Under Lyons, then, the only ‘subjective’ issue is 
‘[t]he reasonableness of [the] fear’ that led the affiants to respond to the 
concededly ongoing conduct by refraining from use of the North Tyger 
River and surrounding areas."135  By doing this, the Court placed new 
emphasis on fear and the reasonableness thereof, which, as noted in Lyons, 
were not dispositive.136  To be sure, they were not here either.  But the 
Court continued to underline this reasonableness:  "[W]e see nothing 
‘improbable’ about the proposition that a company’s continuous and 
pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river would cause nearby 
residents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway and would 
subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms."137  It stated more 
explicitly:  "The proposition is entirely reasonable, the District Court found 
it was true in this case, and that is enough for injury in fact."138  Yet, this 
last sentence is potentially ambiguous.  Is the reasonableness alone of the 
proposition sufficient for injury-in-fact or is reasonableness only sufficient 
                                                                                                                 
responsible for these effects."  Id. at 199–200.  
 131. Id. ("Los Angeles v. Lyons, relied on by the dissent, does not weigh against 
standing in this case." (citations omitted)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (citations omitted). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.; see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983) ("It is the 
reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry . . . ."). 
 136. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8. 
 137. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. 
 138. Id. at 184–85. 
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if the proposition is also true?  To restate this question:  Should courts 
follow a one-pronged test (reasonableness of the proposition) or a two-
pronged test (reasonableness of the proposition and truth of the 
proposition)?139 
The Court probably did not intend a one-pronged approach.140  It 
would mean cognizing reasonable fear as injury-in-fact.  And this would be 
directly opposed to the Lyons Court’s footnote.141  That said, even the more 
likely intended understanding modifies the Lyons fear-based standing 
framework.  Lyons requires a real threat of imminent harm for this harm to 
constitute injury.  Laidlaw requires a real or "true" harm but only a 
reasonable fear thereof.  Potentially, the set of reasonably feared harms is 
broader than that of imminently threatened ones.  Because the harm—or at 
least the conduct that led to the harm—in Laidlaw was "ongoing" and 
"continuous," Laidlaw does not conclusively establish this distinction.142  
                                                                                                                 
 139. Cf. Davison, supra note 19, at 98–99  (suggesting that the court applied a test with 
two elements—plaintiffs’ statements of fear or concern and conditional statements to refrain 
from recreational activity—but that the court did not indicate whether this test was 
conjunctive or disjunctive). 
 140. But see id. at 108–09 (arguing for an understanding of Laidlaw’s cognizability of 
fear-based injury test that is closer to the first option suggested above than the second). 
Justice Ginsburg did not state that the affiant members, in order to establish a 
reasonable concern or fear about the effects of Laidlaw’s pollutant discharges, 
had to establish either that they had specific knowledge of the types and amount 
of pollutants being discharged by the Laidlaw facility, or that they had a 
reasonable belief that Laidlaw’s pollutant discharges were in violation of 
discharge limitations . . . . 
Id. at 108.  Davison suggests that "general knowledge" of the defendant’s conduct is 
sufficient.  Id. at 109.  That said, Davison does not envision this test having broader 
applicability outside of environmental suits or, even, Clean Water Act suits.  Id.  Hardy 
views Laidlaw as more permissive and less specific to environmental cases:  "[T]he Court 
affirmed standing based on claims that the plaintiffs had chosen to forgo recreational 
opportunities on the river in question, even though the Court accepted the finding that there 
was, in fact, no basis for that fear."  Hardy, supra note 82, at 58.  See also Craig, supra note 
19, at 182 ("[T]he Court subjectivized these risks [to human health] by elevating the 
plaintiffs’ ‘fear of risk’ to legally cognizable injury status."). 
 141. See Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983) ("The reasonableness of Lyons’ fear is 
dependent on the likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct.  It is the 
reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the 
plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.").  That is, however reasonable the plaintiff’s fear, if the 
threat whose object it is is not real, it is not cognizable as injury. 
 142. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.  Mank thinks that, because of this, "reasonable concern," 
that is, reasonable fear, would likely only be cognizable with actual conditions leading to the 
harm:  "If Laidlaw had been dumping a harmless substance into the river, it is doubtful that 
the Court would have found that reasonable grounds for avoiding use of the river."  Mank, 
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 19, at 686.  Mank, however, acknowledges the 
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But it does suggest it.143  Laidlaw stands for a potential expansion of the 
role of fear in leading to cognizable injury for standing.   
Subsequent circuit court decisions reflect the tension between these 
two understandings of fear-based standing in Laidlaw.  Gaston Copper, 
decided by the Fourth Circuit shortly after Laidlaw, involved a similar 
factual background.144  The plaintiffs were environmental organizations 
some of whose individual members owned property and engaged in 
recreational activities in the area near a facility operated by Gaston 
Copper.145  They noted that Gaston Copper, through smelting facilities that 
it operated, discharged polluted wastewater into a river.146  The individual 
members of the plaintiff organizations asserted that fear of pollution in the 
river and other downstream bodies of water was the source of harm:  For 
example, Wilson Shealy owned a lake downstream from the smelting 
facility.  He claimed that he "limit[ed] the amount of time that he and his 
family sw[a]m[] in the lake because of his concern that the water [was] 
polluted.  He also limit[ed] the quantity of fish that they [ate] out of fear 
that Gaston Copper’s chemicals ha[d] lodged in the fish."147 
In a rehearing en banc of an appeal from a dismissal of the suit for lack 
of standing,148 the court addressed injury-in-fact.  It considered the issue 
with regard to Laidlaw,149 which it understood to indicate that "citizen 
affidavits attesting to reduced use of a waterway out of reasonable fear and 
                                                                                                                 
ambiguity in this part of Laidlaw and notes that the Court "did not define when a plaintiff 
has ‘reasonable concern’ sufficient to meet standing requirements."  Id. 
 143. Cf. Davison, supra note 19, at 109 (suggesting that, although the discharges were 
ongoing, the harm that was cognizable was the effect of the discharges). 
 144. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 
149 (4th Cir. 2000) (indicating that the Fourth Circuit decided the case on Feb. 23, 2000).  
Laidlaw was decided on Jan. 12, 2000.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 167. 
 145. See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 150–51 (noting that Wilson Shealy was "a 
CLEAN member who own[ed] a lake only four miles downstream from Gaston Copper’s 
facility"); id. at 153 (describing Guy Jones who was a member of both Friends of the Earth 
and CLEAN and who engaged in recreational activity in an allegedly affected river). 
 146. See id. at 152 (describing Gaston Copper’s "discharge of wastewater containing 
limited quantities of pollutants" into bodies of water pursuant to a permit); id. at 153 
("[P]laintiffs claimed that Gaston Copper had exceeded its permit’s discharge limitations on 
numerous occasions, failed to observe its permit’s monitoring and reporting requirements, 
and failed to meet its schedule of compliance."). 
 147. Id. at 153. 
 148. See id. (describing the case’s procedural history). 
 149. See id. at 156–57 (citing Laidlaw for the proposition that "health and recreational 
interests are constitutionally recognized as cognizable bases for injury in fact" (citations 
omitted)); id. at 159 (relying on Laidlaw when ruling on fear of pollution as a basis for 
standing). 
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concern of pollution ‘adequately documented injury in fact.’"150  After 
assessing the plaintiffs’ factual allegations, the court found the plaintiffs’ 
fears reasonable:  "Further, CLEAN has presented ample evidence that 
Shealy’s fears are reasonable and not based on mere conjecture."151  And, 
later:  "Shealy’s testimony that pollution of the type discharged . . . has 
reached his lake in the past shows that his fears are based on more than 
mere speculation."152  In Gaston Copper’s understanding of Laidlaw, 
reasonable fear combined with objective evidence of a threatened harm was 
sufficient to establish cognizable injury:  "Shealy’s reasonable fear and 
concern about the effects of Gaston Copper’s discharge, supported by 
objective evidence, directly affect his recreational and economic interests.  
This impact constitutes injury in fact."153 
Gaston Copper appears to endorse a two-pronged Laidlaw test, similar 
to that discussed above.  Cognizable injury-in-fact exists when there is 
reasonable fear and objective evidence that supports the existence of this 
fear.  The application of this test may be limited to environmental suits,154 
but, even if so, the emphasis on reasonableness of fear is striking.  Lyons’s 
emphasis on the reality of a threat is maintained, even clarified and 
emphasized.  Fear can have a central place in an injury-in-fact analysis.   
In 2006, the Second Circuit set out the most expansive test in Denny v. 
Deutsche Bank.  The case involved a class action suit "against professional 
advisors for improper and fraudulent tax counseling."155  Two of the 
plaintiffs "challenge[d] class certification on the grounds that:  (1) [T]he 
class contain[ed] members who ha[d] not yet been assessed tax penalties 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See id. at 159 (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183). 
 151. Id. at 157. 
 152. Id. at 158. 
 153. Id. at 161.  But see Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 19, at 686–
87 ("According to Gaston Copper’s [sic] reasoning, a plaintiff can sue if her recreational 
activities are harmed or diminished because of her reasonable concern about a potential 
probabilistic injury.").  Gaston Copper would offer, under this view, a more permissive 
approach than Laidlaw, at least as regards probabilistic harm, which, however, is distinct 
from fear. 
 154. Cf. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that probabilistic 
harm "has been most commonly recognized in environmental cases"); Davison, supra note 
19, at 109 (emphasizing Laidlaw’s relation to Clean Water Act citizen suits).  But cf. Becker 
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 230 F.3d 381, 387 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Laidlaw in a standing 
analysis as part of an ultra vires challenge to Federal Election Commission regulations for 
the proposition that the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s fear is the point on which a standing 
analysis turns).   
 155. Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2006).   
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and who . . . therefore lack[ed] Article III and/or statutory standing . . . ."156  
That is, the plaintiffs argued that any harm alleged by the class members was 
hypothetical and, therefore, not cognizable as injury.157  The Second Circuit 
rejected this argument.  According to the court:  "An injury-in-fact may 
simply be the fear or anxiety of future harm."158  The court did not impose 
any confirmatory requirement.  "The risk of future harm may also entail 
economic costs . . . but aesthetic, emotional, or psychological harms also 
suffice for standing purposes."159  To be sure, the court moved away from this 
expansive, general rule when applying the law.  The court, finding cognizable 
injury, emphasized the reliance costs of allegedly faulty tax advice.160  But it 
also indicated that the fear of being audited by IRS was a cognizable, 
psychological injury.161  Simply stated, no view of fear-based standing is 
more expansive than Denny’s.  Under it, fear of—or even mere anxiety 
about—future harm is cognizable as injury.   
E.  Conclusion 
On a broad level, fear has had a circumscribed role in leading to 
cognizable injury for standing.  It is foundational to—but not by itself 
sufficient for—a First Amendment chilling effect claim.  Conversely, for a 
First Amendment pre-enforcement challenge to a statute, fear—potentially 
less objectively demonstrable fear—is sufficient to establish cognizable 
injury.  A well-founded or reasonable fear may be sufficient, but also, to 
follow certain courts, a fear that is merely not imaginary or wholly 
speculative may be sufficient.  As an auxiliary to harm, as an anticipatory or 
proleptic harm, there may be some space for fear to have a more extensive 
role.  Lyons, emphasizing the need for real threat and non-subjective fear, 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 264 ("The Matteis argue that the Denny class includes (by definition) 
two groups who have not suffered and are not likely to suffer an injury-in-fact—the so-
called ‘future risk’ plaintiffs . . . .").   
 158. Id.  Curiously, the Denny court did not rely on any on previous fear-based standing 
case law to develop this test.   
 159. Id. at 265 (emphasis added). 
 160. See id. (describing the costs incurred as a result of the defendants’ alleged conduct, 
for example, paid advice to correct previous tax returns). 
 161. See id. at 265, 266 n.5 (describing the potential of IRS punishment or penalty); cf. 
id. at 266 ("The other elements of Article III standing—traceability and redressability—are 
also satisfied.  That these injuries—psychological and economic—are fairly traceable to the 
alleged conduct of the defendants is clear . . . ."). 
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foreclosed such a possibility, but, more recently, Laidlaw, emphasizing 
reasonableness, has raised it. 
At the broadest level, there seems to be a tendency for courts to expand, 
however tentatively, the cognizability of fear as injury-in-fact. Although there 
is generally a requirement that a plaintiff asserting fear demonstrate its reality 
or the reality of the threat or threatened harm on which it is predicated, cases 
such as New Hampshire Right to Life and Gaston Copper move away from 
this standard.  They place an additional focus on the plaintiff who is afraid. 
Subsequent cases point to the continuing development of the doctrine of 
fear-based standing.  There is a greater emphasis on fear, an extension of the 
doctrines into additional areas of the law, particularly national security, and a 
tendency to move away from the three distinct categories outlined above and 
to merge the particular aspects of the strains of the doctrine. 
III.  Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Fear-Based Standing 
A.  Introduction 
Fear-based standing is a well-established and frequently invoked 
doctrine, as Part II of this Note has shown.  Its functioning and exact 
perimeters have not been fully determined, but this is a result of circuit 
courts’ repeated consideration of the doctrine and its multiple aspects with 
recent Supreme Court guidance charitably described as hermetic.  The 
doctrine’s importance has led to its unsettled character.  In light of this 
unsettled character—or perhaps because of it—since 2007, the Sixth Circuit 
has begun what is in effect a wholesale rethinking of the doctrine.  It has set 
out four distinct approaches to fear-based standing.  Three, none of which 
commands a majority of the court, appear in the opinions of ACLU v. NSA, 
and one, which is the decision of the unanimous majority of the court, in 
White v. United States. 
B.  ACLU v. NSA:  Three Potential Approaches 
1.  Introduction 
a.  Argument 
In ACLU, the Sixth Circuit offers the most extensive recent discussion 
of fear-based standing and the clearest, most complete statements of what a 
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more permissive doctrine might be.162  Because there is no majority 
opinion,163 the case does not resolve what the rules or standards for fear-
based standing are.  Rather, the case is most valuable for isolating and 
identifying different approaches to fear-based standing.  The Sixth Circuit’s 
decision contains three opinions—a lead opinion, a concurrence, and a 
dissent—which express three distinct approaches to fear-based standing.  The 
lead opinion’s approach is restrictive and traditional.  It would permit only a 
limited class of alleged injuries to constitute injury-in-fact sufficient for 
standing.164  The concurrence and the dissent offer approaches that would 
expand the cognizability of fear-based harm.  The dissent, which is more 
expansive than the concurrence, is open to fear independently fulfilling the 
injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing and, perhaps more 
significantly, suggests the application of a single rule of decision to all fear-
based standing claims.165 
b.  Factual Background 
ACLU involved a challenge to the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
(TSP) operated by the National Security Agency (NSA).166  Briefly, "the 
TSP includes the interception (i.e., wiretapping), without warrants, of 
telephone and email communications where one party to the 
communication is located outside the United States"167 and when "the NSA 
has a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication" has 
some relation to al Qaeda.168  The plaintiffs did not claim to be members of 
al Qaeda or its supporters, but were "journalists, academics, and lawyers 
who regularly communicate with individuals located overseas, who the 
plaintiffs believe are the types of people the NSA suspects of being al 
Qaeda terrorists."169  Alleging injury from the TSP, the plaintiffs sued for a 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See generally ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 163. See id. at 648 (Batchelder, J.) (offering the lead opinion); id. at 688 (Gibbons, J., 
concurring) (offering a concurring opinion that would resolve the issue of standing in the 
same way, but for different reasons); id. at 693 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (offering an opinion 
that would reach a different conclusion on standing). 
 164.  See infra notes 173–82 and accompanying text (discussing the lead opinion).   
 165. See infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting 
opinion).   
 166. Id. at 648 (Batchelder, J.). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 169. Id. at 648–49. 
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permanent injunction against the continued operation of the TSP—
particularly its wiretapping and data-mining components—and a 
declaration that the TSP violated constitutionally and statutorily protected 
rights.170  On cross-motions for summary judgment at the district court, the 
plaintiffs prevailed on the "data-mining aspect of [their] claim"; the NSA 
prevailed on the wiretapping aspects of the claim.171  On appeal to the Sixth 
Circuit, the NSA argued that "the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the 
State Secrets Doctrine prevented adjudication on the merits."172 
2.  Lead Opinion:  The Traditionalist-Compartmentalized Approach 
As noted, Judge Batchelder’s lead opinion offers the most restrictive 
approach of the three to fear-based standing.  Her approach is predicated 
on, and fits into an enumerated list of, the plaintiffs’ claims; she evaluates 
standing for each of them on its own terms.  Batchelder characterizes the 
plaintiffs as having asserted six claims, of which three are constitutional 
and three statutory.173  Fear-based standing is implicated only in the first of 
these claims.  The plaintiffs’ argument for standing for this claim is 
predicated on fear-related injuries-in-fact.174  It is also a claim that asserted 
violation of First Amendment rights.175  Batchelder presents the plaintiffs as 
having asserted two such injuries-in-fact in support of standing on this 
claim, but only resolves the first—"[the plaintiffs’] inability to 
communicate with their overseas contacts by telephone or email due to their 
self-governing ethical obligations"176—on fear-based standing grounds.177 
Batchelder follows Laird’s approach to a chilling effect as cognizable 
as injury-in-fact in a First Amendment claim.  Such an approach rejects a 
"subjective chill"178 as sufficient and requires "something ‘more.’"179  That 
is, "to allege a sufficient injury under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must 
establish that he or she is regulated, constrained, or compelled directly by 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. at 649. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 651. 
 173. Id. at 652–53. 
 174. See id. at 653–55 (discussing the injuries alleged in the plaintiffs’ first claim).   
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 653. 
 177. See id. at 653–55 (listing the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries).  
 178. Id. at 661. 
 179. Id. at 660. 
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the government’s actions, instead of by his or her own subjective chill."180  
The chilling effect, if it is to be sufficient for standing, must not be 
predicated solely on an individual’s personal, subjective fear, but also on 
objective evidence of coercive or regulatory governmental action.   
Yet, according to Batchelder, the plaintiffs’ alleged injury does not 
exceed this insufficient subjective chill.181  The ACLU plaintiffs asserted 
less of an injury than did the Laird plaintiffs, who were not able to establish 
standing to sue:  "[U]nlike the Laird plaintiffs, the plaintiffs here do not 
assert that they personally anticipate or fear any direct reprisal by the 
United States government . . . ."182 
3.  Concurring Opinion:  Unified Approach I—"Laidlaw Lite" 
Judge Gibbons concurs with Batchelder in the court’s judgment.183  
The plaintiffs did not meet Article III’s standing requirements.  
Specifically, Gibbons would find that they cannot establish injury-in-fact.184  
Gibbons’s opinion deals explicitly with fear-based standing,185 but it differs 
significantly from Batchelder’s.  It offers a different way of assessing fear-
based standing.  This way is more accepting of the role of fear in leading to 
injury-in-fact.   
Gibbons does not offer the comprehensive, claim-by-claim analysis 
that Batchelder does.186  Rather, Gibbons begins by addressing 
constitutional standing for all claims,187 finds that no claim can satisfy the 
constitutional injury-in-fact requirement,188 and does not proceed further.189  
Gibbons would not find that Laird or its progeny are controlling, but, 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id. at 661. 
 181. See id. at 662 ("Moreover, even if their allegations are true, the plaintiffs still 
allege only a subjective apprehension and a personal (self-imposed) unwillingness to 
communicate, which fall squarely within Laird . . . ." (citations omitted)). 
 182. Id. at 663. 
 183. Id. at 688 (Gibbons, J., concurring).   
 184. Id. at 688.   
 185. See id. at 689 (emphasizing fear as determinative of the standing issue). 
 186. See id. at 658 (Batchelder, J.) (setting out a claim-by-claim approach to her 
standing analysis and distinguishing it from those of the concurrence and the dissent).   
 187. Id. at 688 n.1 (Gibbons, J., concurring).   
 188. See id. ("Because in my view the plaintiffs have no constitutional standing to raise 
any of their claims, I find it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of other statutes.").   
 189. Id.  
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rather, Lyons and Laidlaw.190  Fear, to the extent that it is alleged as an 
injury, is a cognizable injury in the same way that an imminent threat of 
harm is a cognizable injury.191  While fear is alleged to be cognizable as 
injury-in-fact, it is so as a proxy for the as yet unrealized harm, which, 
should it be realized, would be a cognizable injury-in-fact itself.192  The 
First Amendment analysis has no place here.193 
Gibbons takes as the rule of decision the rule supplied in the Lyons 
footnote, as modified by Laidlaw:  Laidlaw, in her view, allows fear to 
be cognizable as injury if it is reasonable and if it has as its object harm 
from conduct to which the plaintiff is subject.194  This two-part test 
incorporates a subjective element (reasonableness of fear) and an 
objective element (being subject to conduct).195  The harm on which the 
fear is predicated remains the basis of the injury-in-fact.  Because the 
plaintiffs do not and cannot show that they are actually subject to the 
alleged harmful conduct—NSA wiretaps—they cannot establish injury-
in-fact—and therefore cannot establish standing—regardless of how 
reasonable their fear may be.196 
4.  Dissenting Opinion:  Unified Approach II—Fear Itself 
In his dissent, Judge Gilman offers an approach to fear-based 
standing that is the most innovative approach in ACLU and most suited 
to informing subsequent efforts to expand the doctrine of fear-based 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See id. at 689 (relying on Lyons and Laidlaw for a rule of decision).   
 191. See id. ("In order for a plaintiff to show that the injury from a government policy is 
actual and imminent, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he personally would be subject to the 
future application of that policy." (citations omitted)).  
 192. See id. at 689 n.2 ("This is not to say that a plaintiff lacks standing until a 
defendant has acted.  A ‘genuine threat’ of enforcement of a policy against a plaintiff who is 
demonstrably subject to that policy supports standing." (citations omitted)).   
 193. See id. at 688 n.1 (noting disagreement with Batchelder "about the depth of 
treatment required, at least with respect to the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims and FISA 
claim"). 
 194. See id. at 689 ("In summary, I read Laidlaw to require that plaintiffs demonstrate 
that they (1) are in fact subject to the defendant’s conduct, in the past or in the future, and 
(2) have at least a reasonable fear of harm from that conduct."). 
 195. See id. ("[T]he only ‘subjective’ issue here is ‘the reasonableness of the fear’ that 
led the affiants to respond to that concededly ongoing conduct." (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 
at 184)). 
 196. See id. at 692 ("[T]he state secrets privilege has prevented the plaintiffs from 
conducting discovery that might allow them to establish that they are personally subject to 
the TSP, as I believe constitutional standing requires.").   
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standing.  Gilman’s departure or, phrased more positively, innovation, is 
simply this:  He combines Batchelder’s reliance on Laird and Gibbons’s 
reliance on Laidlaw into a single rule of decision.197  By combining two 
disparate strains of fear-based standing analysis, he sets out a 
comprehensive approach to injury-in-fact for fear-based standing.   
According to Gilman:  "My colleagues believe that the attorney-
plaintiffs must establish that they were actually subject to surveillance 
under the TSP, whereas I conclude that a demonstration of a reasonable, 
well-founded fear that has resulted in actual and particularized injury 
suffices."198  This approach to fear-based standing still contains an 
objective component, but it is no longer the cause of fear, but the effect 
of fear.   
This is a new test.  Under it, reasonable fear of unlawful 
government action would satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for 
Article III standing.  It is not restricted to particular types of claims, 
whether First Amendment or environmental.  Nor does it extend the 
cognizability as injury-in-fact of an as yet unrealized harm to a point 
when it is merely anticipated.  Rather, fear is a harm cognizable as 
injury-in-fact, or it produces and exists concurrently with a cognizable 
harm.  The requirement that the fear have a basis in actual conduct has 
eroded:  Reasonable fear alone is more than sufficient.199  If any basis in 
actual, objectively verifiable conduct be required—and it is not200—it 
need only have a decidedly post factum character:  As noted, it would be 
an effect of fear, not a cause. 
5.  Conclusion 
For the judge or litigator seeking to understand the contours of fear-
based standing, ACLU is a difficult case.  It does not establish or 
confirm any rule of decision for injury-in-fact in a fear-based standing 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See id. at 697–98 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (applying Laidlaw to a chilling effect 
analysis). 
 198. Id. at 702. 
 199. See id. at 699 ("Based on the principles set forth in Laidlaw, the ‘reasonableness of 
fear’ of the attorney-plaintiffs strikes me as being well beyond what is needed to establish 
standing to sue." (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184)). 
 200. See id. at 702 ("[T]he critical question in this case is . . . whether the 
‘reasonableness of the fear’ of such surveillance is sufficient to establish that they [the 
plaintiffs] have suffered actual, imminent, concrete, or particularized harm from the 
government’s alleged unlawful action."). 
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analysis.  If it stands for any single proposition, it would be this:  A 
plaintiff’s attempt to establish Article III standing on the basis of an 
alleged fear-related injury is not likely to be successful. 
ACLU’s value lies not in setting a rule of decision, but in offering 
different approaches to or ways of thinking about fear-based standing.  
The three opinions in the case provide three such approaches.  Judge 
Batchelder notes that fear can produce a chilling effect, which, when it 
regards First Amendment rights, is cognizable as injury-in-fact.  Judge 
Gibbons would cognize fear as injury to the extent that it is anticipatory 
of harms that are so cognizable.  Fear would extend the time during 
which a harm is cognizable as injury to some time before the harm, as 
yet unrealized, becomes imminent.  Judge Gilman would have 
reasonable fear be cognizable injury.  Gilman’s approach to fear-based 
standing is the most expansive of those discussed in this Note, more so 
even than the Second Circuit’s approach in Denny, because it is not 
limited to one strain of fear-based standing—anticipatory harm, for 
example—but transcends the divisions between the strains of fear-based 
standing.  Gilman’s is a permissive and unified approach.   
Again, there is no resolution of these approaches here.  That is left 
to subsequent cases.  But the case, particularly in its concurring and 
dissenting opinions, expresses a willingness to look beyond current case 
law, and envision new rules expanding the cognizability of fear-based 
harm. 
D.  White v. United States:  Saying "No" to Fear-Based Standing 
1.  Introduction 
Since ACLU, several appellate decisions have considered fear-
based standing.201  Most apply the doctrine as set out traditionally in 
Laird, Lyons, and Babbitt.202  The Sixth Circuit, however, in 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See generally Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009); Morrison 
v. Bd. of Ed. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 202. See, e.g., Morrison, 521 F.3d at 610 ("Absent a concrete act on the part of the 
Board, Morrison’s allegations fall squarely within the ambit of ‘subjective chill’ that the 
Supreme Court definitively rejected for standing purposes.  Morrison cannot point to 
anything beyond his own ‘subjective apprehension and a personal (self-imposed) 
unwillingness to communicate.’" (citations omitted) (quoting ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 
662 (6th Cir. 2007) (Batchelder, J.))).  To be sure, Morrison hints at the modification seen 
later in White, a modification that requires actual, imminent harm to fulfill the "more" 
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White,203 examines plaintiffs’ arguments for standing based on fear in a 
way that combines all three areas of fear-based standing doctrine 
considered hitherto.  The White court’s way of doing this—at the 
broadest level—is similar to that suggested by either Judge Gibbons or 
Judge Gilman in ACLU—it combines all fear-based standing inquiries 
into a single analysis that follows the approach seen in courts’ 
assessment of alleged anticipatory harm injuries.  However, while 
Gibbons and Gilman urge an expanded role for Laidlaw in determining 
cognizable injury-in-fact, the White court returns to Lyons and offers a 
more restrictive test, one which eliminates the cognizability of fear as 
injury. 
This subpart explores the Sixth Circuit’s assessment of fear-based 
standing in White.  In doing so, it adopts the following analytical 
approach:  It sets out the court’s characterization of the claims, 
examines the rule of decision and the application thereof, and discusses 
how the court understands the role of fear in the decision.  Although the 
case contains—and the court considers—claims that are not fear-based, 
this subpart does not address them.204 
2.  Factual and Procedural Background 
In its decision in White, the court addressed what it termed a "pre-
enforcement challenge"205 to the Animal Welfare Act,206 particularly as it 
related to cockfighting.  The sections of the Act at issue proscribed "various 
activities associated with animal fighting that involve interstate travel and 
                                                                                                                 
requirement, but here, such a showing is not dispositive because the plaintiff cannot meet the 
lesser standard set by ACLU.  See id. ("In order to have standing, therefore, a litigant 
alleging a chill must still establish that a concrete harm—i.e. enforcement of a challenged 
statute—occurred or is imminent." (citing Am. Library Ass’n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1193 
(D.C. Cir. 1992))).  Subsequent case law follows Morrison in conjunction with White for the 
more restrictive rule, as will be discussed below.  See All Children Matter, Inc. v. Brunner, 
No. 2:08–cv–1036, 2011 WL 665356, at *4  (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2011) ("Both Morrison and 
White highlight the necessity of the component of imminent or actual harm to a plaintiff’s 
alleged injury-in-fact to confer standing in an as-applied, pre-enforcement challenge."). 
 203. See White v. United States, 601 F.3d. 545, 550–51 (6th Cir. 2010) (characterizing 
certain injuries asserted by the plaintiffs as fear-based). 
 204. See id. at 552 (discussing economic injuries as a basis for standing).   
 205. Id. at 547. 
 206. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–56 (2006) (setting out federal 
regulations on animal treatment). 
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commerce."207  Although the Act did not itself proscribe "animal fighting, 
including cockfighting,"208 state law in all fifty states did.209  Initially, the 
Act contained an exception that related to live birds.  According to the 
court:  "[The Act’s] prohibitions applied to fighting ventures involving 
birds ‘only if the fight is to take place in a state where it would be in 
violation of the laws thereof.’"210  However, a 2002 amendment narrowed 
the exception211 and a 2007 amendment added restrictions on "knives, 
gaffes and other sharp instruments intended for bird-fighting purposes."212 
The plaintiffs were individuals involved in business that related to 
birds, particularly gamefowl, and the president of the American Game Fowl 
Society.213  The plaintiffs sold, transported, showed, and collected 
gamefowl.214  Because of the proscriptions of the Act and thinking that Act 
might be enforced against them, the plaintiffs brought suit against the Act 
for declaratory and injunctive relief.215 
Fear was the basis of many of the injuries that the plaintiffs claimed.  
The court characterizes the alleged injuries of the plaintiffs by referring to 
such concepts as fear, risk, and chilling.  The court mentions five plaintiffs 
and their respective injuries.  White "fear[ed] arrest under the AWA and 
consequent economic damages."216  Taylor claimed, in part, injuries from 
"fear of wrongful prosecution."217  Doolittle "ceased to ship birds even for 
lawful purposes because of the risk of wrongful prosecution."218  Seville 
                                                                                                                 
 207. White, 601 F.3d at 549.   
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. (noting that "Louisiana’s ban had not yet taken effect at the time at which 
the plaintiffs filed their complaint and that cockfighting remains legal in some U.S. 
territories and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico"). 
 210. Id. at 548 (quoting Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 
90 Stat. 417 (1976)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. at 549–50 (listing the plaintiffs’ occupations and their connection to 
gamefowl).  White sold chickens "for breeding and show purposes" for supplemental 
retirement income.  Id. at 549.  Taylor sold gamefowl for "show and breeding purposes."  Id.  
Doolittle "operated a feed store" that catered to the "gamefowl industry."  Id.  Seville, 
president of the American Game Fowl Society, "work[ed] as a gamefowl judge and 
promote[d] gamefowl shows."  Id. at 550.  Brooks "collect[ed] rare gamefowl stock for show 
and breeding purposes."  Id.   
 214. Id. at 549–50. 
 215. Id. at 549. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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asserted injury because of "the legal risks associated with transporting birds, 
including that of wrongful prosecution."219  And Brooks argued that "the 
AWA had reduced his ability to sell birds for non-fighting purposes because 
it had chilled the purchase and transport of breeding and show birds."220  
Collectively, the plaintiffs asserted an injury in the "chilling [of their] right to 
travel with chickens intended for non-fighting purposes."221 
In setting out its analytical approach, the court considers all of the fear-
based claims together.222  The Sixth Circuit lists four types of injury:  "first, 
the plaintiffs’ economic injuries caused by the AWA; second, the plaintiffs 
fear of false prosecution and the resulting ‘chill’ on the plaintiffs’ conduct; 
third, the AWA’s violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; and fourth, 
the AWA’s violation of the principles of federalism."223  All fear-based injury 
is contained in the second category—both pre-enforcement fear and alleged 
chilling effect injury.224  The following section explores these fear-based 
injuries in the court’s analysis of Article III standing. 
3.  White’s Analysis:  Rewriting the Doctrine 
In its analysis of fear-based injury, the court first addresses fear225 of 
false prosecution and then addresses alleged chilling effect injury.226  
Although it treats the two alleged injuries sequentially, it applies closely 
similar rules of decision for their analyses.  According to the Sixth Circuit,  
                                                                                                                 
 219. Id. at 550. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. at 552 ("[W]e can distill the claimed injuries into four 
categories:  . . . second, the plaintiffs’ fear of false prosecution under the AWA and resulting 
‘chill’ on the plaintiffs’ conduct . . . .").   
 223. See id. at 552 (listing the injuries in four, not two, groups). 
 224. See id. at 555 (closing the discussion of alleged chilling effect injury before 
discussing other alleged constitutional injuries).    
 225. Id. at 553–54.  There is, throughout the court’s opinion, some imprecision in its 
use of the terms "fear" and "risk."  The court uses the terms synonymously or 
interchangeably.  This is seen clearly at the outset of the court’s section on fear-based 
standing:  It titles its section "Fear of false prosecution and resulting ‘chill’ on plaintiffs’ 
conduct" while the very first sentence in the section reads:  "The risk of false prosecution 
under the AWA is also too speculative to confer standing on the plaintiffs."  Id. at 553 
(emphasis added).  This conflation of the terms appears throughout the opinion, although 
commentators on the broader issue argue that the terms refer to distinct concepts.  See Craig, 
supra note 19, at 150 (describing "emotional injury," "fear of environmental contamination," 
and "increased risk of disease" as distinct types of harm).   
 226. White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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Lyons supplies the rule of decision for all alleged fear-based injuries.  All are 
analyzed under Lyons’s anticipatory harm framework—regardless of whether 
they are more properly classified as pre-enforcement fear or alleged chilling 
effect injury.  Chilling effect jurisprudence only adds a further restriction—
that the alleged chill affect First Amendment rights. 
In order to distill this rule, the court first collapses a pre-enforcement 
fear analysis into an anticipatory harm one.  The district court followed a pre-
enforcement fear analysis when ruling on the plaintiffs’ fear of prosecution 
claim.  It invoked Babbitt’s "credible threat of prosecution"227 test.  Because 
the plaintiffs did not assert that they "[were] going to . . . engage in prohibited 
conduct,"228 the district court found that there was no credible threat of 
prosecution and concluded that the injury-in-fact requirement for standing 
had not been met.229 
The Sixth Circuit rejects this reasoning by applying a "threatened 
injury" test:  "A threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute 
injury in fact."230  The plaintiffs’ alleged, threatened injury, false prosecution, 
                                                                                                                 
 227. White v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-118, 2009 WL 173509, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 
26, 2009) (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 822 
F.2d 1390, 1396 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 
U.S. 289, 298 (1979))).   
 228. Id. at *4.   
 229. See id. ("Plaintiffs’ pleading as to the scenario that must unfold to injure 
them . . . is ‘simply too speculative’ or ‘highly conjectural, resting on a string of actions the 
occurrence of which is merely speculative’ to present a threat of imminent injury." (quoting 
Cohn v. Brown, 161 F. App’x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2005))). 
 230. White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rosen v. Tenn. 
Comm’r of Fin. & Admin, 228 F.3d 918, 929 (6th Cir. 2002)).  The Sixth Circuit displaces 
the pre-enforcement fear analysis without direct comment.  As it notes:  "Whether or not the 
plaintiffs alleged an intention to engage in prohibited conduct is not relevant to their 
allegations that they risk false prosecution under the AWA even if they engage only in 
lawful conduct."  Id.  That is, according to the Sixth Circuit, the district court was wrong to 
apply a two-part Babbitt test—intent to engage in conduct arguably constitutionally 
protected, but statutorily proscribed and credible threat of prosecution under the statute—
and to conclude that, because the plaintiffs did not fulfill the first part of the test, they could 
not fulfill the second part.  At least under the facts of White—significantly, a false 
prosecution claim—the first part of the test is "not relevant."  Id.  This reasoning does not 
affect the validity of the second part of the Babbitt test, the fear-based part of the test and the 
part that requires a credible threat of prosecution.  But the Sixth Circuit distances itself 
from—if not abandons and implicitly rejects—this second part of the Babbitt test as well.  
See id. ("This issue aside, however, the district court was correct to conclude that the risk of 
false prosecution to the plaintiffs is too speculative to confer standing.").  The court, here, 
does not argue for the application of a different rule, but focuses on the conclusion under the 
different rule.  To expand on this approach:  The result reached under Babbitt is the same as 
that reached under Lyons or an even more restrictive approach.  One could argue, although 
the court does not, that the coincidence of the results under these two different tests points to 
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however, is "conjectural"231 and "speculative."232  As such, it is too remote or 
uncertain to constitute cognizable injury.233 
This is a restrictive rule of decision.  To the extent that it invokes prior 
fear-based standing case law, the court only cites Lyons—the seminal 
anticipatory harm case.234  In its assessment of the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, 
the court emphasizes not the plaintiffs’ reaction to the threats that they 
alleged, but the likelihood of these threats being realized.  The court focuses 
on the objective components of fear—threats and the probability of their 
realization—rather than subjective elements, such as apprehension or 
psychological trauma.235  Without a clearly established objective basis, pre-
enforcement fear will not be cognizable injury for Article III standing.236 
                                                                                                                 
the correctness of the court’s ultimate disposition rejecting an argument for fear-based 
standing.  Such an argument, however, would not offer much guidance about how to 
approach fear-based standing arguments. 
 231. Id. at 554 (quoting White, 2009 WL 173509, at *4). 
 232. Id. at 553. 
 233. See id. (comparing the facts of White to those of O’Shea v. Littleton, a suit for 
injunctive relief against judges allegedly engaged in "discriminatory and unconstitutional 
bond setting, sentencing, and mandating of fee payments" (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 
U.S. 488, 491–92, 497 (1974))). 
 234. Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).  This citation 
from Lyons does not itself address fear, but the cognizability of future harm generally:  "The 
plaintiff must show that he ‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some 
direct injury’ as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury 
must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’"  Lyons, 461 U.S. at 
101–02 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court here explicitly discusses a fear-based 
argument for injury-in-fact, but does not subject it to a fear-based standing analysis, even 
though it cites a case that provides or has been determined to provide a rule for fear-based 
standing.  See ACLU v. NSA 493 F.3d 644, 689 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gibbons, J., concurring) 
(relying on the Lyons footnote for a rule of decision for fear-based standing, specifically 
anticipatory harm (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8))).   
 235. See White, 601 F.3d at 554 ("While wrongful prosecution may be more likely here 
than in O’Shea . . . the risk remains too remote to confer standing."); cf. Lin, supra note 19, 
at 946–49 (discussing the differences between fear and risk as they relate to harm in an 
environmental law context).  According to Lin:  "[E]ven if objective levels of risk remain the 
same—indeed, even if they decrease—public concern about risks may nevertheless rise.  As 
the ability to detect low-level risks improves, scientists will generate more risk related 
information. . . .  [S]uch information may also increase public apprehension in both rational 
and irrational ways."  Id. at 947–48 (citations omitted).  At this point in White, what seems to 
be at issue is more the likelihood, considered objectively, of wrongful prosecution and not 
the plaintiffs’ subjective beliefs about its likelihood.  "While wrongful prosecution may be 
more likely here than in O’Shea . . . the risk remains too remote to confer standing."  White, 
601 F.3d at 554.  By favoring an objective test to the exclusion of a subjective one or one 
with a subjective component, the court effectively transforms its fear analysis into a risk 
analysis—a particularly restrictive risk analysis. 
 236. See White, 601 F.3d at 554 n.5 (discussing a possible objective basis for the 
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When the court turns to alleged chilling effect injury, it follows the same 
analytical approach:  The court analyzes alleged chilling effect injury as 
anticipatory harm.  Even chills of First Amendment rights "will not suffice 
for standing absent a real and immediate threat of future harm."237  One might 
expect Laird to supply the rule of decision here238—and to be sure it is 
implicated in the restriction of cognizability to First Amendment claims239—
but it does not, apart from adding the further requirement that the chill be of 
First Amendment rights.  The court emphasizes Lyons and its progeny 
instead.240  In fact, the court’s rule here is arguably more restrictive than 
Lyons’s.  Lyons emphasizes the reality of the threat.241  Here, the Sixth 
Circuit emphasizes both the reality and the immediacy of the threat.242  In 
doing so, the court sets out a rule similar to that in the pre-enforcement fear 
part of its analysis, where the court requires a "certainly impending" threat.243  
The only difference is the First Amendment addendum.  In both rules, any 
subjective element is minimized.  An objective test will determine the 
cognizability of an alleged injury. 
In applying this rule, the court explicitly relies on its analysis of the 
plaintiffs’ pre-enforcement fear argument—the analysis in which it applied 
an anticipatory harm rule:  "As argued above, the risk of false prosecution the 
                                                                                                                 
plaintiff’s fear of false prosecution in defendants’ alleged "providing to law enforcement 
officials or other organizations ‘false or misleading information pertaining to characteristics 
of chickens").  The plaintiffs suggested initially, although not on appeal, that individuals and 
groups such as the Humane Society of the United States aimed at subjecting the plaintiffs to 
prosecution under the AWA by falsely affecting law enforcement officers’ understandings of 
what activity with respect to what birds constituted a violation of the Act.  Id. 
 237. Id. at 554. 
 238. Cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (discussing the circumstances under 
which a subjective chill can be cognizable as injury). 
 239. White, 601 F.3d at 554 (citing Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 962 
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14)). 
 240. See id. (citing Hange v. City of Manchester, 257 Fed. App’x. 887, 891 (6th Cir. 
2007) (relying on Lyons) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 
(1983))).  
 241. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8 ("It is the reality of the threat of repeated injury 
that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.").  To be 
sure, later in the footnote, the Court mentions the requirement that the threat be immediate as 
well as real, but by mentioning reality independently in a preceding sentence, the Court 
focuses on that aspect of the test.  See id. ("The emotional consequences of a prior act simply 
are not a sufficient basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury 
by the defendant." (emphasis added)). 
 242. See White, 601 F.3d at 554 (listing both requirements—reality and imminence—
without assigning priority to either of them or adding special emphasis to either of them). 
 243. Id. at 553. 
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plaintiffs face in this case is too speculative to confer standing.  Their 
resulting decision to curtail their activities based on their subjective fear of 
prosecution—the alleged ‘chill’ on their constitutional rights—does not affect 
this analysis."244  That is, pre-enforcement fear is the source of the chill.  
Because this fear is purely subjective—and therefore not cognizable—the 
resultant chill is also subjective and therefore not cognizable. 
Alleging a chilling effect injury does not change the analytical 
approach—it remains Lyons’s restrictive anticipatory harm test.  Laird’s 
chilling effect analysis has no bearing on the cognizability of the plaintiffs’ 
alleged chilling effect injury.  To be sure, the court mentions the "something 
more" test,245 but only injury that is cognizable under Lyons can fulfill this 
requirement.  Merely reasonable fear will not suffice.246 
When applying this rule, the court considers whether the plaintiffs 
alleged injury that could constitute "something more":  "While the plaintiffs 
argue that law enforcement officials’ mistaken belief regarding the 
distinctive characteristics of fighting birds helps transform their subjective 
fear of prosecution into a fear of imminent injury sufficient to confer 
standing, the risk of wrongful prosecution remains overly speculative, even 
in light of this allegation."247  The plaintiffs failed to fulfill the objective 
component of a fear-based injury analysis under Laird and could not 
establish cognizable injury because the court defined the harm that would 
be cognizable harm in Lyon’s terms, as "fear of imminent injury."248 
                                                                                                                 
 244. Id. at 554. 
 245. See id. ("[S]ubjective apprehension and a personal (self-imposed) unwillingness to 
engage in First Amendment conduct, without more, fail to substantiate an injury-in-fact for 
standing purposes." (quoting Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d  602, 610 
(6th Cir. 2008) (citing ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 662 (6th Cir. 2007) (Batchelder, J.)))).  
Laird sets the parameters of Morrison’s analysis; the Morrison court frames the question 
that it considers as an inquiry into what set or sets of facts fulfill Laird’s "more" test.  See 
Morrison, 521 F.3d at 608–09 (summarizing the Laird test and noting that "[t]he question 
before us, then, is what ‘more’ might be required to substantiate an otherwise-subjective 
allegation of chill, such that a litigant would demonstrate a proper injury-in-fact?"). 
 246. See White, 601 F.3d at 554 ("[S]ubjective apprehension and a personal (self-
imposed) unwillingness" to engage in First Amendment conduct, "without more," "fail[s] to 
substantiate injury-in fact for standing purposes." (quoting Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd 
Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 610 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 662 (6th Cir. 
2007) (Batchelder, J.)))). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S 95, 107 n.8 (1983) ("The emotional 
consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient basis for an injunction absent a real 
and immediate threat of future injury by the defendant").  The term "imminent" does not 
appear in Lyons, but appears in the test adopted in Lujan and subsequently is recited in 
anticipatory harm cases.  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
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Lyons provides a rule for fear-based standing generally; Laird adds the 
specific requirement that alleged chilling effect injuries affect First 
Amendment rights.  To establish cognizable injury-in-fact for a First 
Amendment chilling effect claim, the Lyons test must be met.  The 
plaintiffs, however, did not meet it.   
4.  Conclusion 
The White court sets out a reactionary approach to fear-based standing.  
All fear-based injury is anticipatory harm, and is to be analyzed as such.  
The White court collapses pre-enforcement fear into anticipatory fear;249 it 
also collapses alleged chilling effect injury into anticipatory fear.250  To 
                                                                                                                 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).  The White court does not draw a distinction 
between the terms.  At the beginning of its discussion of fear-based standing, it cites Lyons, 
although not exclusively, when setting out a rule of "certainly impending" harm to be 
required for cognizable injury.  White, 601 F.3d at 553 (quoting Rosen v. Tenn. Comm’r of 
Fin. & Admin., 228 F.3d 918, 929 (6th Cir. 2002)). 
 249. See supra Part III.D.3 (discussing the White court’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ pre-
enforcement fear claim).  The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio has recently 
adopted White and, in particular, this understanding of it.  In a pre-enforcement challenge to 
the constitutionality of campaign laws the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for 
lack of standing.  All Children Matter, Inc. v. Brunner, No. 2:08–cv–1036, 2011 WL 
665356, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2011).  The plaintiffs asserted a chilling effect as injury in 
response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.  Id. at *7–8.  The court 
analyzed the plaintiff’s argument for cognizable injury under Morrison’s understanding of 
Laird and under White:  "Both Morrison and White highlight the necessity of the component 
of imminent or actual harm to a plaintiff’s alleged injury-in-fact to confer standing in an as-
applied, pre-enforcement challenge."  Id. at *11.  But the plaintiff "present[ed] no evidence 
at all to demonstrate that it has suffered or will suffer an imminent harm through the 
enforcement of the statutes or regulation."  Id. at 14.  Of particular note here is the avoidance 
of a pre-enforcement fear analysis, which Morrison mentions and which White incorporates 
into its effectively uniform approach.  See Morrison, 521 F.3d at 609 (citing Younger for the 
proposition that "fears of prosecution cannot be merely ‘imaginative or speculative’") 
(quoting Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971))).  To be sure, the plaintiff did not argue for 
standing on the basis of pre-enforcement fear, but the court’s applying a restrictive test from 
a related, but distinct area of the law, while citing cases that refer to a more apparently 
applicable test, is indicative, at least, of a post-White weakening of the doctrine of pre-
enforcement fear as cognizable injury. 
 250. See All Children Matter, No. 2:08–cv–1036, 2011 WL 665356, at *4 ("At bottom, 
ACM offers no showing of imminent or actual harm beyond its self-imposed chill.").  Here, 
again following White, but also Lujan, the All Children Matter court moved away from the 
chilling effect analytical approach seen in ACLU.  According to Judge Batchelder:  "[T]o 
allege a sufficient injury under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he or she 
is regulated, constrained, or compelled directly by the government’s actions, instead of by 
his own subjective chill."  ACLU, 493 F.3d at 661 (Batchelder, J.).  That is, the chilling 
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determine whether a chill is cognizable, one determines whether the fear on 
which it is predicated is cognizable.  To do this, one uses an objective test.  
If a threat is actually imminent, then fear thereof is cognizable as injury.  If 
the threat is not actual or not imminent, it is not cognizable.251 
As noted, the White test is reactionary.  It adopts the most restrictive 
approach to fear-based standing of those seen hitherto.  It begins with 
Lyons’s focus on the reality of a threat, adds an additional emphasis on the 
imminence of the threat, and applies this test not only to situations of 
anticipatory harm, but also to chilling effects and pre-enforcement fears, 
which have been cognizable with the showing of a credible threat or a not 
wholly subjective or imaginary fear.252 
By adopting this test, the Sixth Circuit retreats from ACLU.  To be 
sure, at the broadest level, it may exhibit some similarity with ACLU—
allegations of fear-based injury are unlikely to be cognizable253—but it 
rejects sharply the tendency toward permissiveness seen in ACLU.  The 
White court does not mention Laidlaw or the Laidlaw-influenced 
concurrence and dissent in ACLU.254  The reasonableness of fear is not at 
                                                                                                                 
effect is itself a harm, but one that becomes cognizable when combined with the presence or 
application of governmental coercive force.  See id. at 663 ("[T]he something ‘more’ 
required by Laird is not more subjective injury, but is the exercise of governmental power 
that is regulatory . . . .").  In All Children Matter, by contrast, the court requires harm in 
addition to the subjective chill, not objective confirmation that the subjective harm actually 
exists. 
 251. See supra Part III.D.3 (discussing the White court’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ 
chilling effect claim).  Because Lyons is more restrictive than Laird, and because—for 
alleged chilling effect injury—both cases’ tests are to be considered, Lyons sets the rule for 
the nature and type of fear necessary to serve as a basis for standing.  Laird, then, has a more 
limited role—it provides further restrictions not contained in Lyons, namely that the alleged 
chilling effect injury must affect a First Amendment right to be cognizable.  
 252. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (applying an 
actual and well-founded fear test); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 
289, 298 (1979) (reciting both credible threat and non-imaginary fear rules); Humanitarian 
Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133, 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) (following the 
three-part Thomas test, which includes the requirement of a credible threat).   
 253. Cf. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 500 (2009) (discussing the 
dissent’s suggestion that "realistic threat" be used as the test for anticipatory harm and noting 
that "[t]hat language is taken, of course, from an opinion that did not find standing, so the 
seeming expansiveness of the test made not a bit of difference.").  Factual situations that fail 
to meet the requirements of permissive tests will also fail to meet the requirements of 
restrictive tests.  That said, not every argument for fear-based standing has failed.  Laidlaw, 
Gaston Copper, Meese, Ozonoff, and Paton, for example, all exhibit cognizable, fear-based 
injury.  Whether they would under White is not certain.   
 254. See White, 601 F.3d at 554 (referring to the lead opinion in ACLU as cited in 
Morrison (citing Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 610 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(citing ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 662 (6th Cir. 2007) (Batchelder, J.)))). 
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issue; rather, its validity as a test or part of a test is implicitly rejected.  The 
White court mentions the lead opinion in ACLU and cites its "something 
more" test with some approval.  But even this approval is qualified.  
"Something more" becomes an actual, imminent harm, rather than an 
exposure to governmental coercive or regulatory force.255  Phrased more 
generally, to the question of whether fear is cognizable as injury-in-fact for 
Article III standing, White offers a clear answer:  No. 
E.  Conclusion 
White and ACLU express different visions of the doctrine of fear-based 
standing.  ACLU is permissive, but inconclusive—its permissiveness 
appears in the tests followed by the concurring and dissenting judges.  
White is restrictive and conclusive.  But this does not mean that White 
actually clarifies the current doctrine of fear-based standing.  Far from it.  
White may command a majority of the court, while ACLU does not.  But 
ACLU has been considered favorably outside of the Sixth Circuit, and 
White has not.  Further, and more problematically, White implicitly rejects 
Supreme Court precedent (Babbitt, American Booksellers, and Laidlaw), 
which, of course, it cannot overrule. 
However, by setting aside the specific content of the White and ACLU 
rules, one sees an additional similarity between the cases in the desire to 
unify the doctrine of fear-based standing.  Judges Cole and Gilman, 
however much they disagree as to the substantive content of the doctrine, 
would have there be one rule applied to all fear-based standing claims.  The 
next Part of this Note explores what such a rule should be. 
                                                                                                                 
 255. See id. ("While the plaintiffs argue that law enforcement officials’ mistaken 
belief . . . helps transform their subjective apprehension of prosecution into a fear of 
imminent injury sufficient to confer standing, the risk of wrongful prosecution remains 
overly speculative, even in light of this allegation."); All Children Matter, Inc. v. Brunner, 
No. 2:08–cv–1036, 2011 WL 665356, at *4  (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2011) ("At bottom, ACM 
offers no showing of imminent or actual harm beyond its self-imposed chill").  The All 
Children Matter court continues:  "To survive Defendants’ summary judgment motion, 
ACM must have submitted affidavits or other evidence showing, through specific facts, that 
it had suffered or would suffer an imminent harm from the enforcement of the statutes."  Id. 
at *4. 
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IV.  A New Analytical Framework 
A.  Introduction 
This Note has shown that the doctrine of fear-based standing is 
undergoing significant changes.  Two radically different trends have 
emerged in recent decisions, whether those of federal district courts, the 
courts of appeals, or the Supreme Court itself.  One of these trends would 
expand the doctrine to the point where fear is almost independently 
cognizable as injury-in-fact.  The other would all but eliminate it as a basis 
for standing.  Within these two overarching trends, rules of decision in 
particular subparts of the doctrine vary, often subtly at times, due to the 
particular characterization of an issue or the nature of a plaintiff’s claim.  
This Part of this Note, on the basis of this ferment and uncertainty in the 
doctrine, proposes and argues for a framework that would settle the 
doctrine.  The second subpart sets out in detail the differences between 
different areas of the doctrine of fear-based standing as seen in the cases 
considered in the second and third Parts of this Note.  The third subpart 
outlines and explicates a framework that the Note urges courts to adopt.  
The framework clarifies and resolves the present difficulties that the second 
subpart discusses.  The fourth subpart argues for this proposed framework 
on the ground that it clarifies and unifies the doctrine of fear-based standing 
while accounting for recent trends in the development of the doctrine. 
B.  Existing Analytical Approaches:  Weaknesses and Directions 
The doctrine of fear-based standing has been divided into three usually 
distinct areas, First Amendment chilling effect injury, pre-enforcement fear 
of the enforcement of laws and regulations allegedly violating First 
Amendment rights, and anticipatory or proleptic harm—harm cognized as 
injury before its realization. 
In First Amendment chilling claims, Laird may be well established as 
offering the rule:  A subjective chill—a chill based on a subjective fear—is 
not cognizable without more.256  But what harm constitutes "something 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (identifying the question considered as 
"whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by a complainant who alleges 
that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, 
without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity" and answering in 
the negative). 
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more" remains an open question.257  In First Amendment pre-enforcement 
challenges, case law offers multiple overlapping tests—"actual and well-
founded fear,"258 "credible threat,"259 "not imaginary or wholly subjective 
fear,"260 "realistic danger,"261 or "objectively reasonable fear."262  
Presumably, the existence of a credible threat would imply that any 
resultant fear is not wholly subjective or imaginary.  But, for example, is a 
not imaginary fear objectively reasonable or credible?  From time to time 
courts admit to not knowing.263 
In addition to these points of ambiguity in these two types of First 
Amendment fear-based standing, determining when alleged deprivations of 
First Amendment rights should be analyzed as chilling effects or pre-
enforcement harm also poses a difficulty.264  Particular factual 
circumstances may—and often do—implicate both doctrines, but it is easier 
to establish cognizable injury for a pre-enforcement challenge than a 
chilling effect claim or, at least, a potentially lesser degree of fear is 
required.265 
                                                                                                                 
 257. See Morrison v. Bd. of Ed. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 609 (6th Cir. 2008) ("The 
question before us is what ‘more’ might be required to substantiate an otherwise-subjective 
chill, such that a litigant would demonstrate a proper injury-in-fact?" (citations omitted)); cf. 
Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Line-
drawing in standing cases is rarely easy, but where the plaintiff’s alleged injury is a chilling 
effect on the freedom of speech, the standing inquiry is particularly delicate."). 
 258. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988). 
 259. N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 260. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302 (1979). 
 261. Id. at 298. 
 262. R.I. Ass’n of Realtors v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 263. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 n.12 ("The 
difference between the ‘actual and well-founded fear’ standard and the ‘realistic danger’ 
standard has never been explained, and it should be noted that there are some indications that 
there is no meaningful difference between the two standards."), rev’d sub nom. Amnesty 
Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, __ F.3d __, 
No. 09-4112-cv, 2011 WL 4381737 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2011).  The court declined to answer 
the question because it had "no bearing on the outcome of [the] case, and the parties agreed 
that Article III standing should be addressed under a single standard with respect to all of the 
plaintiffs’ claims."  Id. 
 264. See N.H. Right to Life, 99 F.3d at 14 ("[T]hese two types of injury are interrelated.  
Both hinge on the existence of a credible threat . . . .  If such a threat exists, then it poses a 
classic dilemma for an affected party:  either to engage in the expressive activity, thus 
courting prosecution, or to succumb to the threat . . . .").   
 265. See Joshua Newborn, Note, An Analysis of Credible Threat Standing and Ex Parte 
Young for Second Amendment Litigation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 927, 935–36 (2009) 
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Further, the doctrine relating to anticipatory harm is undergoing a 
process that could only be considered an upheaval.  Before White, the 
primary threshold question was whether fear was cognizable as injury 
only through a subsequent, derivative harm, that is, a chilling effect, or 
was also cognizable presently—and proleptically—in anticipation of a 
future harm, which future harm was the substantive basis of the claim.  
Indeed, the disagreement in ACLU between the lead opinion and the 
concurrence is on just this point.  Since White—and arguably since 
Morrison and Summers—there has been the possibility, at the very least, 
that fear of any harm that is not imminent or immediate is not 
cognizable.266 
Even when anticipatory harm may be cognizable, the analytical 
approach called for is open to question.  Laidlaw, the leading Supreme 
Court decision on the issue, seems to admit of two different 
understandings.  The first, although still an innovation, is more traditional.  
It requires both fear and confirmation of the threat.267  The second, 
requires fear alone or fear and resultant harm.268  Circuit courts have 
tended to favor the more traditional—though also innovative—
approach,269 but not exclusively,270 and sometimes only when cabined to 
particular circumstances or areas of the law.271  Some of the most recent 
opinions—ACLU at the Sixth Circuit, for example—suggest a trend 
                                                                                                                 
("[T]he Court requires plaintiffs to show that their reaction to the challenged statute is 
objectively reasonable.  This is rather simple to do . . . ." (citations omitted)).  That said, 
Newborn actually conflates alleged chilling effect injury with pre-enforcement fear.  In this 
passage, he cites American Booksellers, Meese, Laird, and New Hampshire Right to Life.  Id. 
 266. See supra Parts III.D.1–3 (discussing White and decisions that preceded it).   
 267. See supra Part II.D (arguing that there are two ways of understanding Laidlaw’s 
discussion of fear-based standing and discussing this first understanding). 
 268. See supra Part II.D (discussing the second way of viewing the Laidlaw Court’s 
discussion of fear-based standing). 
 269. See, e.g., Me. People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 285 (1st Cir. 
2006) (determining that a "substantial probability of increased harm" "rendered reasonable 
the plaintiffs’ members in abstaining from their desired enjoyment of the Penobscot"); 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 
2000) (noting that reasonable fear confirmed by objective evidence of the conduct leading to 
it leads to injury-in-fact). 
 270. Cf. Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) (indicating that 
"[a]n injury in fact may simply be the fear or anxiety of future harm" but not relying on 
Laidlaw for this proposition). 
 271. Cf. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003) (extending Gaston 
Copper’s reasoning as regards increased risk to "consumer food and drug safety suits"). 
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toward the increased cognizability of fear,272 even without a confirmation 
requirement.273 
Internal to itself, the anticipatory harm part of fear-based standing 
doctrine is experiencing a moment of crisis.  White implies a rejection of 
not just the rules of decision of one particular area of fear-based standing, 
but those of all areas of fear-based standing.  As noted, because White is 
such a departure from existing case law, it is far from certain that White will 
be followed by courts nationwide, even though it has recently been 
followed in the Southern District of Ohio.274 
This Note has demonstrated three primary areas of uncertainty in the 
doctrine of fear-based standing and its three strains.  First, uncertainty as to 
the contours of particular tests; second, uncertainty as to the 
characterization of alleged fear-based injuries; and, third, uncertainty post-
White as to the cognizability of fear as injury. 
C.  The Proposed Framework 
In view of the current unsettled character of the doctrine of fear-based 
standing and to provide courts with a model for an analytical approach to 
                                                                                                                 
 272. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 689 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gibbons, J., concurring) 
(setting out a Laidlaw-based framework for the analysis of an argument for cognizing 
alleged fear-based injury); id. at 698 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (indicating that the point of 
disagreement with the concurrence is the application of Laidlaw to the facts of ACLU rather 
than the understanding of the rule derived from Laidlaw); Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 
646 F. Supp. 2d 663, 657 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing, with some approval, Gibbons’s 
Laidlaw-based framework), rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 
122 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, __ F.3d __, No. 09-4112-cv, 2011 WL 4381737 
(2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2011).  In Clapper, the Second Circuit accepted fear as a cognizable 
injury.  See Clapper, 638 F.3d at 122 ("Because standing may be based on a reasonable fear 
of future injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury, and the plaintiffs have established 
that they have a reasonable fear of injury and have incurred costs to avoid it, we agree that 
they have standing.").  However, its analysis did not emphasize the injury prong of a 
standing analysis, but the causation prong.  See id. at 133 (discussing the "plaintiffs’ asserted 
grounds for standing"). 
 273. See ACLU, 493 F.3d at 699 (Gilman, J., dissenting) ("Based upon the principles 
set forth in Laidlaw, the ‘reasonableness of the fear’ of the attorney-plaintiffs in the present 
case strikes me as being well beyond what is needed to establish standing to sue.").  To be 
sure, Gilman also indicates that some confirmatory element may be necessary in an injury-
in-fact analysis.  Id. at 702.  But the fact that he steps back at times from advocating such a 
requirement shows a potential direction for fear-based standing doctrine. 
 274. See All Children Matter, Inc. v. Brunner, No. 2:08–cv–1036, 2011 WL 665356, at 
*3–4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2011) (rejecting an argument for alleged chilling effect and pre-
enforcement fear injury by relying in part on White). 
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fear-based standing, this Note proposes the following framework for an 
injury analysis in considerations of fear-based standing.  This framework 
offers modified and relaxed requirements for showing cognizable injury.  It 
applies to all types of fear-based standing: chilling of First Amendment 
rights; pre-enforcement fear of laws and regulations that allegedly violate 
First Amendment rights; and anticipatory harm. 
The framework:  Injury-in-fact requirements for Article III standing 
are met by fear of an existing or threatened harm when (1) there is a 
subjective fear of the harm; and (2) this fear is reasonable, (a) because 
objective evidence shows the actual existence of a threatened harm, or 
(b) because some evidence suggests the existence of a grave harm. 
D.  Explication of and Argument for the Proposed Framework 
1.  Explication of the Framework 
At a broad level, the framework offered above adopts the general, 
theoretical approach common to Laird and its progeny as well as to Lyons 
and Laidlaw.275  Of the approaches considered in the cases discussed in this 
Note, its approach is closest to that seen in Gaston Copper.276  It rejects 
White’s implied restrictive approach.277  It requires the showing of a 
subjective fear as a threshold inquiry and then requires additional showings 
as confirmation of the fear.  Further, like Lyons and Laidlaw it does not 
treat fear as the substantive cause of action, but as an auxiliary that 
enhances or extends forward in time the cognizability of another 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Compare Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) ("Allegations of a subjective 
‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of present objective harm or a threat of 
specific future harm . . . ."), with Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000) ("In the footnote from Lyons . . . we noted that . . . [the 
plaintiff’s] ‘subjective apprehensions’ that such a recurrence would even take place were not 
enough to support standing." (citations omitted)), and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983) ("It is the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to 
the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.").  The insufficiency of 
subjective apprehension—or subjective fear, if there is no distinction between fear and 
apprehension—is common to these two strains of the doctrine.   
 276. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 
161 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Shealy’s reasonable fear and concern about the effects of Gaston 
Copper’s discharge, supported by objective evidence, directly affect his recreational and 
economic interests.  This impact constitutes injury in fact.").   
 277. See White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2010) (developing and 
applying a unified, highly restrictive analytical approach to arguments for fear-based injury-
in-fact for Article III standing).  
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substantive claim.  That said, for reasons that will be explained below, 
under this framework, fear is a more robust auxiliary than under either 
Lyons or Laidlaw.  To consider specific aspects of the framework in more 
detail, this Note will use and manipulate the hypothetical situation of the 
swimmer, the surfer, the shark, and the potential attack. 
Fear of an existing or threatened harm:  The framework applies to the 
fear that underlies a chilling effect as well as pre-enforcement fear and the 
fear that is anticipatory of subsequent harm.  The framework does not 
distinguish between these types of fear.  The harm—alleged injury—can be 
present, as in the case of a chilling effect, or future, as in the cases of pre-
enforcement fear and anticipatory harm.  That said, the framework does not 
extend the cognizability of chilling effects and pre-enforcement fears to 
chills and fears of violations or limitations of rights other than those 
protected by the First Amendment. 
Subjective fear:  This term refers to a fear that is particular to its 
subject and need not have any basis in fact or reason.  For example, fear of 
an imminent shark attack is a subjective fear regardless of whether it is 
experienced by a surfer in the ocean or someone learning to swim in a 
shark-free pool.  It can arise because of actually seeing a shark in the water 
or merely because of having watched Jaws278 recently.  That the surfer’s 
fear seems more likely to be realized and the novice swimmer’s seems 
imaginary at best does not affect the existence of a subjective fear.  That 
said, to an extent, in fact, all fear is subjective.  Because it is a personal or 
collective emotional or psychological response to a threat or threatened 
harm, it exists in the person or group experiencing it.279  Unlike the threat 
which causes it, it does not exist independent of this person or group. 
Reasonable fear:  This is fear that exists because of a process of 
reasoning or the existence of which is justifiable by a process of reasoning, 
whether inductive or deductive.  It is a type of subjective fear—it is 
particular to its subject in the same way that other types of subjective fear—
imaginary fear, for example—are particular to theirs.  But because of its 
being arrived at or confirmable by reason or reasons, it admits of greater 
analytical rigor than other types of subjective fear.  For an example of such 
reasoning, consider the shark attack.  For the novice swimmer learning to 
swim in a shark-free pool, fear of a shark attack is not reasonable.  If there 
is no shark, there can be no shark attack.  For the surfer surfing in a part of 
                                                                                                                 
 278. JAWS (Universal Pictures 1975). 
 279. See ROBIN, supra note 33, at 18 (discussing how fear can be experienced 
collectively). 
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the ocean attractive to sharks, where sharks have been observed, and where 
there have been recent, confirmed incidents of shark-on-human attacks, 
who then witnesses a shark attack a surfing companion, and then sees the 
same attacker-shark approaching, fear is reasonable. 
Objective evidence:  This is evidence the existence of which is capable 
of being demonstrated by a third party and is a necessary premise in fear-
related reasoning.  Consistent with the requirements of the procedural 
posture of a case, courts have accepted plaintiffs’ affidavits attesting to the 
existence of a threat as objective evidence.280  In the shark attack example, 
the best evidence would be the shark, nearby, in the water.  Such evidence 
would also include news reports or other accounts of prior but recent shark 
attacks, viewing dorsal fins in the distance, and more generalized evidence 
of the propensity of locally-found sharks to attack humans.  The critical 
point here is that the threat must be verifiable by an external observer.  The 
amount of evidence offered must be enough to show the actual existence of 
a threatened harm, although as noted, the procedural posture of a case may 
obviate the need to make a complete showing.281 
Actual existence of a threatened harm:  This is where the threat that 
will produce the harm to be cognized as injury exists in fact.  The actual 
existence of a threat is, of course, closely related to the evidence thereof.  If 
there is a distinction to be made, it is that the actual existence of a threat is 
prior to evidence that demonstrates its existence.  To use the shark attack 
example, the shark in the water is the threat.  Reports or images 
documenting the shark’s being in the water are evidence of the threat.  This 
part of the framework, on this example, concerns the reality of the shark’s 
being in the water.   
Some evidence suggests:  For this alternative means of confirming 
subjective fear and thus establishing cognizable injury, complete 
demonstration of the existence of the threat is not necessary.  Rather, 
evidence that by itself would be inconclusive, but that nonetheless indicates 
the possibility of the reality of the threat, here, is sufficient.  In the shark 
attack example such evidence would include reports of a recent shark attack 
in the area, a sighting of what appears to be a dorsal fin in the distance, or 
                                                                                                                 
 280. See, e.g., Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 159 ("In Laidlaw, the Court found that 
several citizen affidavits attesting to reduced use of a waterway out of reasonable fear and 
concern of pollution ‘adequately documented injury in fact.’" (citations omitted)). 
 281. See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir. 
2000) (noting that, in an appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the State-defendant, "the State’s representation cannot remove VRLC’s reasonable fear 
that it will be subjected to penalties for its planned expressive activities").  
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reports that a shark or group of sharks wont to attack is migrating to the 
particular body of water in question. 
Grave harm:  In order to balance the permissiveness of the some 
evidence standard, it is combined with a heightened requirement regarding 
the threatened harm at issue.  Standing doctrine allows for nominal harm to 
constitute cognizable injury.282  This new, alternative test does not allow for 
this possibility.  Determining what exactly constitutes grave harm is the 
province of the courts, and best considered on a case-by-case basis.  But 
such alleged harms as aesthetic injury283 and inability to fish as much from 
a river as at some prior time284 should be insufficient.  Other threatened 
harms, such as deprivations of constitutional rights, particularly First 
Amendment rights, as well as death and personal physical injury, should be 
sufficient.  Standing doctrine, to be sure, requires particularized injury, but, 
in determining gravity of harm, a court may consider the extent to which 
others have been or will be subject to the same threatened harm. 
More generally, as the particulars discussed above demonstrate, the 
proposed framework offers two ways of cognizing threatened harm as 
injury-in-fact.  The first is based on the more restrictive understanding of 
Laidlaw285 but places greater emphasis on demonstrating the reasonableness 
of fear.  The second—the alternative—is an innovation.  It balances 
reduced evidentiary or demonstration requirements with a requirement for 
the increased seriousness of the harm implicated.  Both of these approaches 
are more permissive than the traditional approaches taken in Laird and 
Lyons.  Although, like in the approaches taken by Laird and Lyons, both 
options under the proposed framework require a subjective fear subject to 
confirmation, what constitutes this confirmation differs.  Under both 
alternatives, the requirements are less stringent, although to different 
degrees.  
To demonstrate this, consider again the shark attack example—and 
presume a subjective fear thereof.  Under Lyons, for his or her fear of attack 
to be cognizable as injury, the surfer would need to see the shark 
approaching and—perhaps—see or hear other signs of an immediately prior 
                                                                                                                 
 282. See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 156 ("[T]he claimed injury ‘need not be large, an 
identifiable trifle will suffice.’" (citations omitted)). 
 283. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (noting the cognizability of aesthetic injury). 
 284. See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 156 (indicating that one of the plaintiffs’ members 
asserted that his practice of fishing in a lake had been affected by Gaston Copper’s discharge 
of pollutants). 
 285. See supra Part II.D (discussing possible interpretations of Laidlaw and, especially, 
those presented by circuit courts). 
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shark attack:  blood in the water, screams, other surf boards, recently 
occupied, now abandoned.  That is, a real threat of imminent attack.  Under 
Laidlaw, sharks, known for their propensity to attack, in the water where 
the surfer is surfing would likely be sufficient.  Under the first of the two 
alternatives of the proposed framework, the same facts that would be 
sufficient under Laidlaw would be sufficient, provided that they can be 
demonstrated by evidence—in this example, evidence of both the sharks in 
the water and their propensity to attack.  Under the second alternative of the 
proposed framework, the distant sighting of what looks to be a dorsal fin by 
the surfer while he or she is in the water would be sufficient.   
To be sure, the framework varies in application somewhat across the 
three types of fear-based standing.  This Note does not envision the 
expansion of the cognizability of chilling effect injury and pre-enforcement 
fear to situations that implicate rights other than those protected by the First 
Amendment.  For First Amendment chilling effect claims, the framework 
applies to the fear underlying the chill.  If a subjective fear shown by 
objective evidence of a threat or some evidence of a grave threat leads to a 
chilling effect, the chilling effect is cognizable as injury.  For First 
Amendment pre-enforcement challenges, the framework applies to the fear 
that is itself cognizable as injury.  Here, the framework operates in much 
the same way as for anticipatory harm, where it applies to the fear that 
precedes the harm.   
2.  Argument for the Framework 
a.  Introduction 
The framework proposed above draws on but modifies the analytical 
approaches seen in existing fear-based standing case law.  The argument for 
it proceeds in three steps or as answers to three particular inquiries.  The first 
is the broadest.  It asks whether courts should adopt a unified approach to 
fear-based standing—one that applies one analytical test to all strains of the 
doctrine—or a particularized approach that preserves the distinct analytical 
frameworks of alleged chilling effect injury, pre-enforcement fear, and 
anticipatory harm.  This Note argues for a unified approach.  The second asks 
what type of unified approach should be followed:  a restrictive one or a more 
permissive one?  The question might be rephrased as whether courts should 
follow White or a form of the doctrine as it existed prior to White.  This Note 
argues that the pre-White doctrine should inform courts’ analytical 
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approaches.  The third asks how the pre-White doctrine should be adapted to 
create a unified analytical approach.  The framework answers this question 
and has been discussed above.  Here, this Note argues for the framework’s 
two distinctive features that set it apart from pre-White approaches. 
b.  A Unified Approach 
Courts should adopt a unified approach to an alleged fear-based 
injury analysis for the purposes of determining Article III standing.  They 
should apply the same analytical framework to all arguments for standing 
predicated on alleged fear-based injury.  Such an approach is justified not 
only theoretically, but also—and perhaps more importantly—empirically.  
Theoretically, a unified approach—whatever its content—advances goals 
of clarity and ease of applicability.  A court need not devote as much 
effort into characterizing a claim because, regardless of the 
characterization, the analysis would be the same.  If, as now, different 
analytical approaches are used for different types of claims, the 
characterization itself can become dispositive.  A unified approach—
whether fully restrictive, fully permissive, or otherwise—shifts the court’s 
focus to the nature of the threat, which is the focus of the plaintiff’s 
complaint.   
As a practical matter, as preceding sections of this Note have 
indicated, whether courts should adopt a unified approach to fear-based 
standing is increasingly a settled issue.  Courts’ recent decisions have 
shown a tendency toward, if not an outright explicit preference for, a 
unified approach.286  In a particular case, the adoption of a unified or 
partially unified approach may be explicit and intentional,287 a result of a 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Cf. Michelman, supra note 19, at 104 (urging application of  a uniform test for 
alleged probabilistic surveillance injuries and noting that "[c]ourts’ willingness to apply the 
same standard of likelihood across a variety of contexts . . . establishes a strong baseline 
presumption in favor of a uniform rule that applies in the surveillance context as well as 
others").  Michelman’s uniform test would be "a reasonable likelihood of injury," which he 
indicates, inter alia, "reconcile[s] Laird with Lyons."  Id. at 105.  This Note has argued that 
such an interpretation is unsupported by the case law.   
 287. See N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 
1996) ("Because the threat of prosecution is a common denominator of both types of injury 
[chilling effect and pre-enforcement fear], their existence can be resolved in a single 
inquiry."); Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) ("[A]ny difference between the ‘actual and well founded fear’ standard and the 
‘realistic danger’ standard has no bearing on the outcome of this case, and the parties agree 
that Article III standing should be assessed under a single standard with respect to all of the 
plaintiff’s claims."), rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d 
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plaintiff’s creative pleading,288 or an unintentional effect of the complexity 
of the doctrine.289  Regardless of the reason, courts increasingly combine 
elements of the doctrines in setting out analytical approaches and refer to 
cases that explain one particular strain of the doctrine to decide issues 
pertaining to other strains of the doctrine.290  This occurs regardless of the 
courts’ views of the substance of the doctrine.  For example, despite 
disagreeing radically on whether fear may constitute cognizable injury, both 
the White court and Judge Gilman, dissenting in ACLU, offer unified 
approaches.291  Courts’ tendencies and preferences are clear.  This Note 
follows them.   
c.  What Unified Approach? 
(1)  Threshold Argument:  Why not White? 
The White court’s changes to the doctrine of fear-based standing should 
be rejected by courts considering arguments for standing predicated on fear-
based injury.  Its approach is too substantial a departure from previous case 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, __ F.3d __, No. 09-4112-cv, 2011 WL 4381737 (2d Cir. 
Sept. 21, 2011). 
 288. See McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (describing plaintiffs’ argument as 
invoking Laidlaw in support of cognizing alleged chilling effect injury), rev’d sub nom. 
Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, __ 
F.3d __, No. 09-4112-cv, 2011 WL 4381737 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2011). 
 289. Cf. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (suggesting a 
similarity between pre-enforcement fear and alleged chilling effect injury); Clapper, 638 
F.3d at 133 ("Having accepted the truthfulness of the plaintiffs’ declarations for purposes of 
the summary judgment motion, the government cannot now dispute whether the plaintiffs 
genuinely fear being intercepted . . . .  Thus, we have little doubt that the plaintiffs have 
satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.").  The Second Circuit, in accepting the plaintiffs’ 
allegations about the harms that they suffered (fear and economic costs), also accepted that 
these harms constituted injury-in-fact for the purposes of standing.  That is, it conflated a 
factual question (whether the plaintiffs were afraid) with a legal one (whether the plaintiffs’ 
fear constituted injury).   
 290. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 649–57 (analyzing arguments for 
alleged chilling effect and pre-enforcement fear injuries), rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA 
v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, __ F.3d __, No. 09-
4112-cv, 2011 WL 4381737 (2d Cir Sept. 21, 2011). 
 291. See White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 553–54 (6th Cir. 2010) (offering a 
restrictive unified analytical approach to arguments for the cognizability of alleged fear-
based injury); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 702 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting) 
(offering a permissive unified analytical approach to arguments for the cognizability of 
alleged fear-based injury). 
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law.  Since Babbitt and Laird, courts have tried to assess and account for the 
complexities of alleged fear-based injuries, and have recognized that, while 
many alleged injuries are too speculative to be justiciable, some are not.292  
White may advocate uniformity, but it is not a uniformity of a single rule 
distilled from the various strains of a doctrine.  It is the uniformity left by the 
elimination of the doctrine.   
White’s treatment of alleged fear-based injuries to First Amendment 
rights is more problematic.  Fear-based standing doctrine prior to White 
recognized the uniqueness of First Amendment rights and their warranting 
special protections.293  White eliminates these protections294 and treats such 
claims with the same, if not more, severity with which it would treat fear of 
aesthetic injury, for example.  It is not the purpose of this Note to offer an 
extended defense of the First Amendment and argue for the distinctive 
character and heightened importance of the rights that it protects.  But, given 
their broadly accepted importance, this Note is unwilling to deny them well-
established protections.295 
(2)  Adapting the Pre-White Doctrine 
The framework proposed above adopts the core values of the pre-White 
doctrine.  As discussed, it draws from existing, pre-White analytical 
approaches to fear-based standing.  It incorporates features common to 
                                                                                                                 
 292. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473 (1987) (finding a cognizable chilling 
of First Amendment rights in the government’s classification of films that Keene desired to 
show as political propaganda). 
 293. See, e.g., San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th 
Cir. 1996) ("The only exception to this general rule [non-cognizability of chilling effects] 
has been the relaxed standards for overbreadth facial challenges involving protected speech.  
In these First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has recognized ‘chilling’ effect as an 
adequate injury for standing . . . ." (citations omitted)). 
 294. See White, 601 F.3d at 554 ("[W]here a plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory 
relief to remedy a First Amendment violation, a subjective fear of chilling will not suffice 
for standing absent a real and immediate threat of future harm.").   
 295. Cf. Michelman, supra note 19, at 110 (emphasizing the harm of chilling effects 
and arguing against restrictive approaches to standing in a surveillance context); Miller, 
supra note 19, at 1069–71 (proposing an approach more permissive than the one advocated 
by this Note, namely, that Laidlaw’s "reasonable fear" test be applied more broadly, to 
Fourth Amendment surveillance injury arguments).  To be sure, both Michelman and Miller 
advocate approaches that are more permissive than the one that this Note proposes and urge 
special consideration of Fourth Amendment rights, which the case law has not emphasized.  
Nonetheless, arguments—even those that are primarily theoretical—for the expansion of 
fear-based standing  underscore the importance of the rights presently—or previously, given 
White—protected by the doctrine. 
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analytical approaches for all three strains of fear-based standing doctrine.  
The most common feature of these approaches is that subjective fear is not 
cognizable as injury without an objective, confirmatory element.   
The proposed framework also follows this approach.  But it modifies the 
approach by emphasizing evidentiary showings and by allowing lesser 
evidentiary showings to be cognizable if a grave harm is threatened.  
Evidentiary showing requirements appear throughout the case law.296  The 
proposed framework does not so much innovate here as emphasize a 
sometimes overlooked aspect of the doctrine.   
The proposed framework’s most novel aspect—its alternative means of 
establishing reasonable fear by allowing a showing of less evidence if a grave 
threat is involved—also develops out of existing approaches but applies their 
values to all types of fear-based standing to enhance the goal of uniformity.  
The proposed framework extends the principle that underlies two distinct 
strains of fear-based standing—First Amendment chilling effects and pre-
enforcement fears—namely, that threats to certain rights are sufficiently 
grave that they merit additional protection in the form of increased 
cognizability as injury, to fear-based standing generally.  Current doctrine 
grants cognizability to chills of First Amendment rights and pre-enforcement 
fear of violations of First Amendment rights while it denies cognizability to 
chills of other rights and pre-enforcement fears of violations of other rights 
because it views threats to First Amendment rights as particularly grave and 
these rights as worthy of increased protection.297  The proposed framework 
extends this reasoning.  When grave harm is threatened, the framework grants 
increased protections.  These protections do not, however, include cognizing 
the chilling of the exercise of other, non-First Amendment rights or pre-
enforcement fear of the violations of other rights, but applying the principle 
of increased protection in the face of grave harms to anticipatory harm injury.   
V.  Conclusion 
The doctrine of fear-based standing is an important justiciability 
doctrine.  It operates at the limits of more general standing doctrine and has 
the potential to create standing for a plaintiff whose claims might seem—to 
one unfamiliar with the doctrine—to run the risk of being too attenuated or 
                                                                                                                 
 296. See, e.g., Meese, 481 U.S. at 473–74 (noting that Keene’s affidavits sufficiently 
supported his argument for alleged chilling effect injury). 
 297. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 660–61 (6th Cir. 2007) (Batchelder, J.) 
(discussing courts’ First Amendment chilling effect jurisprudence). 
FEAR-BASED STANDING:  COGNIZING AN INJURY-IN-FACT 1503 
speculative to constitute injury-in-fact.  This Note has shown, however, that 
the doctrine of fear-based standing, despite the fact that courts have 
considered it often since the early 1970s, has not yet coalesced into a fixed set 
of rules or standards.  To be sure, at first glance, aspects of it seem settled—
subjective chills are not cognizable as injury—but closer examination has 
shown that, if the doctrine is settled in any way, it is only at the broadest, 
most general level.   
Further, the doctrine is not content to remain in a fluid state.  Two trends 
have developed in recent years. Since 2000, one trend has pointed toward the 
liberalization of fear-based standing rules of decision, as they currently exist 
and toward the cognizability of fear of future harm as injury without a need 
or much need for confirmation.  Since 2010, there has been a divergent trend 
that rejects the doctrine of fear-based standing and would deny cognizability 
to alleged fear-based injuries unless they are independently cognizable as 
some other type of injury accepted as cognizable.   
In view of this uncertainty in the doctrine, to reject White’s elimination 
of the doctrine and to guide courts as they address arguments for fear-based 
standing, this Note has offered a proposed framework.  This framework 
draws together the best aspects of fear-based standing doctrine as they have 
developed in potentially distinct strains of the doctrine and applies them to all 
aspects of the doctrine.  Under it, subjective fear is cognizable as injury if it is 
reasonable.  And to demonstrate reasonableness, a plaintiff must produce 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of the feared harm. 
  

